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What sort of a man do you consider Diogenes to be? 
«A Socrates gone mad», replied Plato.  
–– Diogenes Laëtrios, ±330. 
 
What is permitted to satire?  
Everything. 
–– Kurt Tucholsky, 1919. 
 
What is peace?1 
[...]. 
–– Johan Galtung, 1969. 
 
One can put it plain and simple: We live in an era of enlight-
ened false consciousness. Whatever this means and whoever 
states such argument for which reason will be discussed later. 
For the moment it might be sufficient to take a step back and 
focus on its symptoms first. As a matter of fact, philosophy 
does not only take place within the ivory towers of academia. 
Taking the simplified image of an «average mass media consum-
er», we eventually talk about someone that tries to make sense 
of the information flow s/he feels confronted with on a daily 
basis. In that context, Niklas Luhmann shaped the concept of 
published opinion (veröffentlichte Meinung) as partly a con-
tra-dictionary element of and partly a stimulating narrative 
on the public opinion (öffentliche Meinung).2 While linking it 
to the sphere of mass media, he dealt with the highly sophis-
ticated question: Why do we know what we know? And for sure, 
he was -- and is -- not isolated in asking so. To a certain 
extent, «the things we know» make us «us». But how does the 
very same system, the «us», react to the (howsoever) perceived 
world outside?  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  The top ten of creative chapter titles I used to read in my peace study studies: «What is Peace?» (Shtro-
mas/Anderson 1995: 15). «What is Peace? What is Organization? -– First: What is Peace?» (Linebarger 1962: 13). 
«In the second place, what is peace?» (Inari 1911: 232). «What is peace?» (Allan 2006: 13). «What is peace?» (Leder-
bach/Jenner 2002: 34). «What is peace?» (Pepinsky 1993: 391). «What is Peace?» (Galtung 2002: 23). «What Is 
Peace?» (Myers-Walls et al. 1993: 66). «What is peace?» (Müller 2003: 53). «What is Peace?» (Duncan-Jones 1952: 6). 
2 In Die Politik der Gesellschaft, Niklas Luhmann (2000: 190-191) thinks «öffentliche Meinung» as «veröffentliche 
Meinung». The two terms of public opinion versus published opinion can be seen as wordplay of sharp distinction. 
!
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 Bad news is good news. In its most positivist and energiz-
ing notion, the published opinion seems to be a suitable tool 
to describe the medial generation of two basic human reactions 
of empathy. Both sound similar, but describe most different 
states: (i) courage and (ii) rage. However critical a «news 
readership» might be: the core of producing, providing, and 
sharing information «of the world» around it, the «us», seems 
to be linked to the consequent indoctrination of a certain be-
lief/sense system (categorizing data) as well as to the conse-
quent retrieval of empathy (acquiring data): Thus, the infor-
mation flow of «globalized knowledge» does indeed call for the 
activation of courage in favour of some people, systems, ide-
as; and rage against some others. 
 This calls for a first, short media observation. On July 
10, 2013, the readership of The Guardian Online can notice a 
strong statement on its screens: In praise of cynicism. In a 
seemingly self-reflective manner, the «you» -- thus, the «us» 
-- is able to “test how cynical you are” (Baggini 2013: 5). 
Following the test, an article of Julian Baggini, a popular 
commentator on philosophical issues, occurs under the same um-
brella. Baggini takes the recent debate on whistle-blowing as 
a discussion starter to speak about the justification of -- 
what might be described as -- «a good portion of cynicism». 
Although many people, according to him, would underline that 
cynicism deepens with age, he argues, “what really happens is 
that experience painfully rips away layers of scales from our 
eyes” (Baggini 2013: 5). Baggini continues in describing some 
forms of cynicism as a greater force for progress than opti-
mism. The escape from a world full of naïveté would simply lie 
in the reclaim of cynicism as a force of «light and truth»: To 
do so, “we need intelligent cynicism, which is not so much a 
blanket negativity, but a searchlight for the truly positive” 
(Baggini 2013: 5). 
The concept of cynicism could indeed help us to approach 
our initial remark on the enlightened false consciousness. In 
!
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its basic notion, it seems to have something in common with 
the ideas on courage and rage. Yet, we do not know how the 
link could be formulated. But who are the agents that Julian 
Baggini would call actors of «intelligent cynicism»? To some 
extent, such actors have to be «intelligent and critical» 
(whatever that means). Furthermore, they should try to «en-
lighten the society» with the ultimate aim of «telling the 
truth», so that Luhmann’s inter-linked concepts of (i) the 
public opinion on x, and (ii) the published opinion on x would 
not stand in sharp contrast -- or even negation -- towards 
(iii) x itself. On the other hand, those actors must be visi-
ble to a descent audience; a public sphere that seems only to 
be reachable through the structural dependencies of mass media 
networks. For the moment, George Carlin might function as a 
respectable personalised placeholder of such an idealised 
agent. The latter analysis will figure out why it must be seen 
as problematic to describe him as a «comedian», although he is 
widely known as such. In 2004, he himself makes a worthy 
statement that contrasts his work from both sheer comedy and 
contemporary cynicism: 
 
I live a personal life of great optimism and positiveness. But I look around and I 
don’t see a way out for this species. […] I look at it and I think: 'Wow, I hope I live 
long enough to watch it all collapse. Just for the fun of it.' […] When you’re born to 
this world you’ve been given a ticket to the freak show. […] Some people are the 
freaks. […] Then there are the people who merely watch the freaks and that’s most 
of us most of the time. […] And then there are those of us who get to comment on 
the freak show, to review the freak show. When people say: “that’s cynical”. I say: 
No, no, no (Carlin 2004: 0:43:20). 
 
Quite obviously, his comment confronts us with a necessary 
condition: although not belonging to the core principles of 
academic research, the communication on the following subject 
has to accept «irony» and «sarcasm» as two essential tools of 
understanding. The following analysis will to a great deal fo-
cus on ironic and sarcastic works. Its task will be to encode 
the cypher of hoax’ hidden meaning. George Carlin, for exam-
ple, sees himself confronted with the public description of «a 
!
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master cynic». The above-sited sequence of an interview held 
for Inside the Actors Studio, less than four years before his 
death, continues with a self-reflection of his oeuvre. If 
George Carlin would have done The Guardian’s «test how cynical 
you are», he might have replied that instead of being cynical, 
his approach should have been considered as «realistic and 
skeptical»: “[...] to point it [the perceived «cynicism» 
around us] out isn’t cynical. To point it out is to be highly 
skeptical of cynical behaviour” (Carlin 2004: 43:23). However, 
this initial step towards a definition on cynicism is not sat-
isfactory. It still feels as if there was something true and 
honest in characterising Carlin’s work as somehow cynical. 
Carlin’s remarks do not manage to deny the common understand-
ing that irony, sarcasm, and cynicism lie on the very same ax-
is of mockery. The more biting it gets, the closer it comes to 
a distinct form of cynicism. We tend to call biting irony sar-
casm. And we tend to call biting sarcasm cynicism. And still, 
George Carlin is right in his remark, that it is «the cyn-
ic[ism]» itself he is mocking on. Do we have to speak about 
cynic counter-cynic[ism]? At this point, Baggini challenges 
us. He complicates the narrative even more while highlighting 
“the importance of distinguishing between thinking cynically 
and acting cynically. [...] For many years, I too have tried 
to make sure that the cynicism in my outlook does not lead to 
cynicism in my behaviour” (Baggini 2013: 3). 
Scene change: Do we need more cynic thought of counter-
cynicism 3  within peace research? If someone tries to locate 
contemporary peace research institutions and searches for aca-
demic categories for its description, one might wonder about 
the distinct ideological gap between (i) the «rebellious and 
alternative», rather «state critical and mass consumption hat-
ing», somehow «distinct left and hippie-like» stereotype that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  Here, I combined the two notions in one phrase: «thought» stands out as Baggini’s element, whereas the notion of 
counter-cynic cynicism relays on Carlin’s remarks. 
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might be associated with the peace movement on the streets 4 ; 
and (ii) the «professionalized», post-«meta critical» field of 
positivistic academia, understood as a «smart» network of 
think tanks that are institutionalised well, state-oriented, 
and mainly concerned on security and anti-terrorism issues. It 
seems, to put it in a nutshell, that nowadays’ peace and con-
flict research did outsource the idea of pacifism to a small 
group of «unprofessional» individuals that are somehow prone 
to «conspiracy theories» and «easy solutions»: slogans such as 
‘soldiers are murders’ or ‘there simply is no just war’ do not 
fit into the picture of a «well-balanced», «enlightened» peace 
research. One example might illustrate these thoughts roughly: 
the changing history of the Peace Research Institute Oslo 5 . 
While, in its first years, PRIO adapted Galtung’s anti-
imperialist, pacifist, and deep-critical approach towards the 
military and used its role as the first institutionalised 
peace research institute to approach structural violence and 
consumerism; the focus went more and more away from being a 
radical, left-leaning institution 6  towards a state-affiliated 
positivist think tank of rather realist approaches with the 
final aim of supporting «security, freedom and democracy»: 
Three terms that are ideologically shaped by the demands of an 
ideology of «non-ideology». It seems as if the professional-
ized peace research lost its ties to many radical peace move-
ments.7 But if academia’s contemporary inquiry mainly addresses 
questions of just war, who then questions war itself? 
Yet, cynicism’s somehow «good attitude» -- the lit up of 
the «dark side» (cynicism’s solely unsupportable version) -- 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Based on a reflective Weltanschauung that has been kept and conserved in not only a few peace movements.  
5  As well as the pacifist figure Johan Galtung is linked to PRIO and its contemporary ideological inversion, the early 
pacifist figure Michael Walzer, then member of the anti-war movement, is linked to the later figure Michael Walzer, 
«Just War» theorist and fellow signatory of the controversial open letter What we are fighting for, a moral defence of 
Bush’s «War on Terror» as just. See Walzer/Huntington et al. 2002 [Nov 11, 2013]. 
6 Here, the simplifying umbrella term should stand for an ideological frame against NATO alliance membership; 
against consumerism; against an all to easy perceived «Western» «moral» double standard within International Rela-
tions; against concepts such as «R2P»; «humanitarian intervention»; and geostrategic security & safety approaches. 
7 This, indeed, hast to be read as a subjective and over-simplifying comment. Although the «stereotypes» one has to 
take into account here could not be more evident: Heritage Foundation; smart-casual shirt style «changing the sys-
tem from within» (tool of communication: the scientific article; the academic conference) versus the untamed and 
loud «against all» programmatic on the streets (tool: the provoking poster; the drum).  
!
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was able to find its way into the academic sphere. In a prais-
ing festschrift, Jeff Everett characterizes Norman Macintosh 8 
as “academe’s joyful Kynic” (Everett 2011: 148). And here, for 
the first time, we read about a cynic form with /k/. We will 
come back to that later. What Everett notices in the work of 
Macintosh is “a reliance on irony, emotive metaphor, humor, an 
excess” (Everett 2011: 149). According to Everett, Macintosh’s 
basic approach would undermine the self-confidence of the 
field’s «intellectual» (different as read before) and mani-
festly cynical authorities. 
«Serious crimes in democratic participation», «an inabil-
ity to address global environmental problems in a meaningful 
way», and «wars being cynically waged in the name of democracy 
and freedom»: Everett names many fields that could be read as 
global symptoms of a cynic superstructure. But what matters 
the most is his aim to draw the line from the cynic super-
structure into the core of our already mentioned ivory towers:  
 
Thousands of accounting academics continue to churn out research that practicing 
accountants themselves never bother to read (in part because of its questionable 
relevance, but also because of its highly technical language), while administrators 
blindly implore their faculty to continue producing this very same research (Everett 
2011: 149).  
 
Here, he portraits Norman’s «Kynical impulse» as a possible 
strategy out, “an impulse that has emerged in a general, 
three-stage shift in his work: from rational skepticism to a 
phase of critical stoicism on to a position of proactive Kyni-
cism” (Everett 2011: 150).9  
If we start to think about two cynic spheres -- whereby 
one of the two seems to be called «the Kynic one» later on --; 
where exactly should we draw the line between them? The main 
research question (and its interwoven sub-questions) will be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8  Since 2011, Norman Macintosh is Professor Emeritus for, what sounds as a contradiction in itself,  «poststructural-
ist approaches» within «Management Accounting & Control Systems» at Queen’s School of Business. 
9 A good indication to clarify Everett’s evaluation might be Norman’s appreciation of Jean Baudrillard’s theory of 
bullshit: Norman’s ultimately Kynical preference, his turn towards Baudrillard and the theory of bullshit, is present-
ed as the aim to find a measure between the «too too big» and the «not too big enough» (Everett 2011: 155). 
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formulated as such: Is it fruitful to characterise Kynic be-
haviour in terms of peace activism? Do we find specific fields 
of contemporary Kynicism? Can, for example, the work of satir-
ical-biting Kabarett be considered as Kynic peace activism? 
What is Kabarett? -- Due to its limited scope, the analy-
sis in hand will focus on (i) a utilization of Kynicism and 
the Kynic school for peace research; and (ii) a preliminary 
development of the term «Kynic peace activism». At the same 
time, the specific example of Kabarett work will be mentioned 
subliminally. Although the later established twofold notion of 
«/c/ynicism versus /K/ynicism» immediately suggests that the 
likewise twofold notion of «/c/abaret versus /K/abarett» must 
be considered as an exemplary empirical case analysis, a de-
tailed elaboration on the diverse work of (political) Kabarett 
artists would simply go beyond the scope of the project.  
Thus, throughout the thesis, the topic of Kabarett will 
remain omnipresent but hidden at the same time -- discernable 
only through its specific diction. Ironically, this improvised 
endeavour, which is constrained by its circumstances, will 
nicely fit the character of a classic Kabarett setting. In 
both its contextual and contentual orientation, The Kabarett 
Of The Kynics will be presented as a holistic mode that di-
rectly affects the style of writing and the variety of illumi-
nating examples from society’s daily life: While asking for 
the hidden cynic and Kynic elements within a howsoever per-
ceived era of enlightened false consciousness, the reader will 
be invited to a journey full of stream of consciousness style 
which will be enriched by a Kabarett-esk topic diversity that 
reaches from critically reflected military cynicism on the 
global scale to thrown-away food on the local scale, from the 
seemingly too big to the seemingly too small -- and back.   
Therefore, the main hypothesis (and its sub-hypotheses) 
will be: «We», enlightened subjects, know very well that cer-
tain characteristics of the Western-oriented, developed socie-
ties and its praise on the individual’s right to consume do 
!
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not fit the most elementary discourses and principles of «sus-
tainability». Nevertheless the pooled «we», the enlightened 
crowd, does not seem to transcend its lifestyle accordingly.  
 Kabarett is a tool that enables the Kabarett artist to re-
flect on political issues by peaceful means. It aims to work 
as a mirror of society. So does the analysis in hand. Somehow, 
it deals with questions of peace and war and the borders be-
tween friend and foe; borders which the artist tries to trans-
cend. Its approach can be characterized as «satirical peace 
activism». The task of the thesis will be to specify the mean-
ing of «satirical peace activism» into a more specific form of 
«Kynic peace activism» -- a voice of reason in a world filled 
by Arendt’s banality of evil? 
Kabarett makes use of language. The power of language 
might be seen as the «weapon of the pacifist». Task of the un-
conventional writing style -- that might also challenge the 
classic borders of academic sobriety -- will be to apply this 
very «language weapon». Here, we will eventually recognize Mi-
khail Bakunin’s affectation of an announcing collective anar-
chism; or Mikhail Bakhtin’s affectation of acting out carni-
valesque behaviour. A colourized Johan Galtung -- framed in 
yellow, green, and red -- makes the start. The three colours 
stand for his three notions of violence: direct, structural, 
and cultural. After introducing them, the first chapter will 
also present a threefold list of popular responds towards «in-
visible violence» and a threefold search for «the cynic».!
The second chapter will pick up on that point. As already 
sketched, it makes sense to reflect on a two-fold notion of 
cynicism. Here, a contextualization of «contemporary cynicism» 
versus «Ancient Kynicism» will be introduced. In the 1980’s, a 
re-discovery of the old philosophical school of Kynicism took 
place. Peter Sloterdijk (1983), Michel Foucault (1984), and 
Slavoj Žižek (1989) took distinct elements out of the wide 
field of Kynicism to integrate them into their body of criti-
cal theories. Under the frame of «inversion» (inversion of 
!
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cynicism, truth, and Marx), three theoretical tools -- one for 
each philosopher -- will be carved out and utilized for the 
further analysis. 
The Master thesis aims to develop a practical understand-
ing of «Kynic activism» that neither seems to be tangible with 
positivist «change, democracy, freedom» concepts of «do-good» 
mass mobilization, nor with nihilist disillusion and complete 
resignation as such. The cynic and the Kynic both agree: «The 
system is bad. The human fellows are bad enough to follow the 



















































































They do not know it, but they are doing it. 
–– Karl Marx, 1867. 
 
They know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it.  
–– Slavoj !i"ek, 1989. 
 
Do you know the country where the cannons bloom? 
You don’t know it? You’ll get to know it! 10 
–– Erich Kästner, 1930. 
 
The following chapter will function as tool box. Terms and 
philosophical ideas that must be seen as crucial for (an un-
derstanding of) the further discussion will be introduced. 
Thus, the preconditions will be formulated. Beginning with a 
most notably and elementary definition -- «what is meant by 
violence?» 11  --, further normative concepts such as activism, 
moralism, and disillusion; irony, satire, and mockery will be 
classified before bridging into the debate on different forms 
of «cynicism». Chapter 1 ends with establishing the research 
question and formulating the main hypotheses. 
 
============================================ 
1.1  A-B-C: The threefold notion of violence 
============================================ 
 
Johan Galtung, widely described as the founder of institution-
alized peace research 12 , is known for his threefold distinc-
tions on academic concepts. He made the triangle model a fash-
ionable approach to describe complex and multi-layered phenom-
ena. Mainly known for his «conflict triangle», he described 
peace not only as the antithesis of invisible and visible con-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The German original goes as: «Kennst du das Land, in dem die Kanonen blühn? Du kennst es nicht? Du wirst es kennenlernen!» 
It is a take-off on Johan Wolfgang von Goethe’s quote «Kennst du das Land wo die Zitronen (the lemons) blühen?». 
11 As shown in footnote 1, many analytical texts within peace studies do indeed begin with the question: «what is 
peace?». Here, this question will be affected rather indirectly: «Peace» will be understood as the absence of direct 
and indirect violence of any kind, which admittedly will leave us alone with a utopian concept. 
12 John D. Brewer (2010: 7), for example, names him the “principal founder of the discipline of peace and conflict 




flict, but also differentiated the sphere of conflict into 
three areas. In the Transcend method trainer’s manual, he pre-
sents the «[A]ttitude-[B]ehaviour-[C]ontradiction triangle» as 
part of his conflict theory; the «empathy-nonviolence-
creativity triangle» as part of his conflict practice ap-
proach; and the «direct-structural-cultural triangle» as part 
of his violence theory (Galtung 2000: 11-25). Not without a 
wink, the following remarks -- as well as the whole thesis it-
self -- will be embedded into such consequent tripartism. Gal-
tung’s conflict model works on the assumption that the best 
way to define peace is to define violence, its antithesis. As 
a persiflage on the first of fittingly three conflict trian-
gles, the following thoughts on violence will be structured in 
[A]-[B]-[C] schemata as well.13  
 
[A] Direct violence 
Johan Galtung describes the most obvious form of violence as 
being intended to harm or to hurt. Of all the three forms of 
violence, it is the only directly visible one. Whenever we 
hear of violent attacks such as massacres, terror acts, mur-
der, or «war», we tend to speak about direct violence: “Direct 
violence, visible, destructive, with a will to harm, is the 
form most feared” (Galtung 2000: 21). It might be linked to 
the usage of (armed) force and militarism; the fight between 
individuals and groups. Direct violence is deeply interwoven 
with the perception of the public/published opinion on «the 
other». Critical Discourse Analysts, for example, notice an 
immense focus on direct violence within the media coverage. 14 
Thus, the already mentioned credo Bad news is good news could 
be supplemented by: remember, remember the 11th of September!   
Whereas the 9/11 terrorist acts were acts of «direct violence» 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 For a more profound investigation on Johan Galtung’s Transcend method and his «conflict triangle» concept, see 
Beyer 2008: http://www.transcend.org/tri/#downloads [Oct 10, 2013]. 
14 Holger Pötzsch, for example, builds his model iWar (Pötzsch 2014) on the assumption of the overdetermination of 
the spectator. See Ernesto Laclau’s and Chantal Mouffe’s remarks on the «undertheorization of overdetermina-
tion» in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). The later analysis on Slavoj !i"ek’s The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989) 
will come back to this. 
!
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against a certain group, the terrorists themselves used a dis-
tinct other notion of «violence» to justify their -- using 
Baggini’s elaborated term -- ‘cynic action’: According to 
their perception, they fought against the unfair distribution 
of goods in the world and brand-marked «the West» while at-
tacking the symbolic «hearts of capitalism and militarism» 15 . 
Galtung’s approach of the interwoven forms of violence offers 
us the possibility to understand16 this perception in terms of 
an invisible violence: structural violence. 
 
[B] Structural violence 
With this second term, Johan Galtung relates to suffering and 
death by avoidable reasons such as malnutrition. According to 
his model, structural violence is to be understood as a form 
of indirect violence caused by an unjust structure. And also 
here, some notion of cynicism is used: “To refer to this as 
«early warning» of direct violence to come is [...] cynical 
and disrespectful of the suffering already there. The direct 
violence should be seen as too late warning of unbearable 
[...] conditions, exploited by cynical actors” (Galtung 2000: 
13). These actors -- clearly marked as actors of the «dark 
side» of cynicism -- would then also function as the agents of 
the third, «cultural violence»: the legitimation of (at least) 
one of the other forms as reasonable, right, or even good.  
Coming back to our example of the «9/11 attacks», it was 
not only the terrorists who used one notion of violence to 
justify another. (i) The perceived «structural violence or-
chestrated by the West» led to a use of «direct violence 
against those to blame». Then, «those» (a diffuse group; ad-
ministratively led by the president of the United States) re-
acted themselves with «direct violence». (ii) Under the notion 
of «revenge» certain individual actors were discredited as 
«the evil» or «the devil»; certain collective actors as «out-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See, for example, Osama bin Mohammed bin Awad bin Laden’s (2002) Letter to the American people. 
16 Strictly formulated, this means the understanding of the perception of «unfair distribution of goods in the world» 
as «structural violence». It does not mean «to psychologically understand the terrorist’s behaviour».   
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posts of tyranny» or «rogue state».17 (iii) Finally, a profes-
sionalized act of securitization18 enabled a «coalition of the 
willing» to wage two wars in the name of enduring freedom and 
global justice. The progress of securitization created at 
least enough «public» support for legitimating both military 
actions as somehow democratically backed. But how exactly 




Images 1-2| Selected Economist covers from 2001 to 2011 and its narrative on a «global turning point»: Remember, 
remember the 11th of September. The common receipt to answer to violence seems to be a built-up of armament. In the 
cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, The Economist titles Why They Should Stay and Why America Must Stay. 
 
 
Image 3| Towards the public construction of a just interventionism? Selected Economist covers from 2003 (Iraq), 
2007 (Iran) and 2012/2013 (Syria) deal with the issue of «Western-led» intervention and «regime change».19 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 The term «outposts of tyranny» was established by Condoleeza Rice in 2005, describing the six state actors Belarus, 
Cuba, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Zimbabwe. Rice also characterized the broader Middle East as a «region of tyr-
anny, despair, and anger». See http://www.foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2005/RiceTestimony050118.pdf [Nov 13, 2013]. 
The term «rogue state» was established by Ronald Reagan in 1985. As of November 2013, U.S. government offi-
cials consider the four state actors Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as so-called «rogue states». Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya 
– three states with a recent foreign-backed regime change history – plus North Korea were formerly considered as 
such. See the United States Department of State’s list of «State Sponsors of Terrorism»: http://www.state.gov/ 
j/ct/list/c14151.htm [Nov 13, 2013]. The term «axis of evil» was established by George W. Bush in 2002, describing 
the three state actors Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. In the same year, John R. Bolton, the later U.S. ambassador to 
the United Nations, established the description of «beyond the axis of evil», including Iran, Iraq, North Korea; as 
well as Cuba, Libya, and Syria. See HF: http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/beyond-the-axis-of-evil [Nov 13, 2013]. All 
concepts are closely linked towards the contemporary «War on Terror» narrative. As of 2013, Iran remains the only 
country being an «outpost of tyranny», a «rogue state», and part of the «axis of evil» at the same time. 
18 With reference to Ole Wæver’s securitization approach and to the security study frame of the Copenhagen School as such. 
See, for example, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1997) by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 
19 The cover collections (images 1 and 3) were selected by the author. The photo (image 2) was taken by the author. 
!
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[C] Cultural violence 
Galtung describes «cultural violence» as the sufficient condi-
tion to legitimate the usage of violence as well as the neces-
sary condition of acknowledging violent behaviour as «good» or 
«reasonable». Cultural violence occurs as a result of the cul-
tural assumptions that blind (Galtung) -- and bind (the au-
thor) -- «us», the agents, to direct or structural violence. 
One specific form of cultural violence might be uncovered 
through the analysis of more or less conscious media «war 
propaganda»: “mass media representations which convey a belli-
cose subtext (re)produce violence. They form the cultural pre-
text for justifications of war” (Pötzsch 2005: iv). Holger 
Pötzsch raises a seemingly basic question: Who might have an 
interest in the perpetuated (re)production of a violent dis-
course of conflict by means of the mass media? In doing so, he 
reveals the potential of Galtung’s model of indirect violence: 
Suddenly, it is possible to think and analyse violence in 
spheres in which it might not be visible at first sight. Tak-
ing image 3 as example, we might also ask who have had an in-
terest in calling for a «justified war» on the basis of a 
«proof» 20  that was not even accepted as such by the «critical 
public»21: cui bono? And why? 
One very important awareness we can learn from Galtung’s 
concept is that visible violence does not take place in an 
air-void space. It does not stay alone. It has a violent pre-
history. Each of the three notions of violence offers us a 
channel for criticism. And the model offers us the possibility 
to think, for example, (i) the critique on consumerism and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 As it will be discussed later, this medial «proof presentation» – far from offering proof – involves the coverage on 
the so-called Syrian «civil war» which – far from being a civil war – stands out as a complex military dispute between 
foreign-backed forces, militias, and the Syrian army since early 2011 (using the violent militia oppression against 
peaceful inner-Syrian demonstrators in March 2011 as a moral legitimacy) and has since then developed into a clas-
sic proxy war setting of «one» [Syrian Arab Republic, Hezbollah, Revolutionary Guards, PFLP, Iran, Russia, China, 
Venezuela (and others)] against «another» [diverse arms of armed (exile-)opposition groups, Al-Nusra, ISIL, «FSA», 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United States (and many others)]; characterising the Kurdish fight as a side issue. An-
other common perception of Western/Arab media seems to be the portrayal of the Syrian crisis as a religious 
based Shia-Sunni clash. See recent CNN; BBC; Al Jazeera; Al Arabiya versus RT; PressTV; teleSUR; CCTV coverage. 
21 Another vague term: Here, the «critical public» has to be read as a counter-part towards the affiliated «published 
opinion». Indeed, we have to deal with a very simplifying model here. It is hardly worth mentioning that the same 
limitation applies to terms such as «(mass) media» which should therefore not be read as a monotonic bloc. 
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immensely unequal distribution of wealth; or (ii) the critique 
on «friend-foe» biased news coverage; or (iii) the critique on 
the weapon industry as such as possible critiques on violence.  
This basic approach, in which we speak about visible and 
invisible forms of violence that are linked to each other 
within an interwoven structure22, raised attention in the aca-
demic field. Without directly referring to Galtung, Slavoj 
Žižek elaborated three forms of violence as well. In his best-
seller Violence (Six Sideway Reflections; 2009), he distin-
guishes between one form of visible and two forms of invisible 
violence; and can thus be read as a good example of prominent 
impersonators of Johan Galtung’s addiction towards «the holy 
three».23 
Violence is always connected to harm. But some forms of 
perception are more hidden than others. It is rather easy to 
build the link between «everything that kills and harms in 
front of the camera» and the public protest against «brutali-
ty» (whatever is meant by this term). The more invisible vio-
lence gets, the more difficult it is to articulate the protest 
against it. After working out the possible channels of peace-
oriented social criticism towards a focus on violence that 
goes beyond, we may have a short look into three popular forms 
of resistance towards violence in all of its facets: activism, 
moralism, -- and disillusioned mockery. 
 
=============================================== 
1.2  A-B-C: Three popular reactions to violence 
=============================================== 
 
[A] Stéphane the activist 
Stéphane Hessel stands out as the prototype of a driven activ-
ist against diverse forms of violence. Based on a positivist 
(and quite positive) approach, he pursued the approach of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 The term «military-industrial complex» and its extension towards a «military-industrial-media complex» will be part 
of the later analysis. See also Der Derian’s Military-Industrial Media-Entertainment Network (2009) concept. 
23 Both, Johan Galtung’s and Slavoj !i"ek’s underlying theses are that violence takes on three forms: Galtung 1969 
names «direct violence», «structural violence», and «cultural violence». !i"ek 2009 names «subjective violence», 
«symbolic/linguistic violence» (as objective), and «systemic/structural violence» (as objective). 
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«waking up the people» and encourage them to act «good». Both, 
enormously normative-ontological and structure-affirming at 
the same time (notion: an UN diplomat with «dreams») he per-
sonifies the «do-good» involvement of collective actors such 
as Greenpeace or Amnesty International (notion: «urgent ac-
tions» against atrocities; good against evil) and stands as a 
representative for many other individuals that tried to 
«change the systems from within» such as his UN colleague Jean 
Ziegler. Thus, our Stéphane the activist is to be read as a 
synonym rather than a historical figure.   
Nevertheless, the two most influential books that he wrote 
shortly before his death call for a short investigation. They 
do not only shed a light on a diverse life experience. They 
also give a revealing insight into the confrontation of a 
leading social-critic with the earlier mentioned empathic 
feelings of rage and courage: Hessel’s call for outrage. 
Until November 2013, his most prominent work, Indignez-
vous, translated into 35 languages, was sold more than four 
million times worldwide.24 After the Time for Outrage (this be-
ing the official English title), Stéphane Hessel went one step 
further in his appeal and called for Engagez-Vous: Get In-
volved. In both works (2011a/b), he articulates his criticism 
on the contemporary world society in a wide range: He notices 
(i) a growing gap between the very rich and the very poor, 
(ii) a somehow selective press that seems to be dependent on 
factual constraints, (iii) a historical destruction of the en-
vironment, (iv) a historical market radicalism and neoliberal 
dismantling of the state welfare systems, among other topics. 
Diverse representatives of social movements all over the 
world called his thoughts influential and underlined its role 
model function.25 Especially the so-called Occupy (Wall Street) 
movement seemed to be influenced by the ideas of Hessel: His 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See the official homepages http://www.indignezvous.com/ and http://www.engagezvous.com/ [Nov 14, 2013]. 
25 Both, the so-called «Occupy» activist movement (in the US, Greece, the UK, Brazil, Mexico, Germany and else-
where); and the so-called «Anonymous» hacktivist movement make references to Stéphane Hessel. See for example 
http://www.occupytogether.org/aboutoccupy/#background and https://whyweprotest.net/community/ [Nov 13, 2013]. 
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name emerged as a synonym of a forward thinker of the multime-
dia crowd; his quotes were enriched with hash-tags (#ows), a 
common recognition for the phenomenon of twitter/facebook ac-
tivists.26 From 2011 on, such protesters began to use the slo-
gan of «We The 99%» around the world; portraying themselves as 
«the suffering, the good» site against «the greedy 1% one».  
Thus, our Stéphane appears to be a friend of democratic 
movements, a friend of the masses. Atrocities do exist, but 
with the tools of information and activism, «we» (the 99%) can 
manage to overcome them and «change the world to a better 
place.» In challenging all three forms of violence, he still 
embraces the positive.  
 
[B] Fabian the moralist 
The second character in our cabinet of social-critics will be 
a fictional one, penned by Erich Kästner in 1931: Fabian. Fa-
bian is the main protagonist in Kästner’s most biting novel 
which uses not only the protagonist’s name in his title, but 
also the fitting description: Fabian. The Story of a Moralist. 
Erich Kästner, widely described as a literal enlightener and 
voice of reason, was known for light sarcasm and wit. Yet, 
while many of his works were influenced by cheerful- and posi-
tiveness (fitting the character of Stéphane), the basic colour 
of Fabian is dark. It sounds plausible that Kästner worked up 
parts of his own character. In a speech for the PEN club in 
1957, he, «Erich the moralist» introduces himself in third-
person: “Our guest, ladies and gentlemen, is not an aesthete; 
he is rather a schoolmaster! [...] He is a moralist. He is a 
rationalist” (Kästner; cit. Bemmann 1985: 158) 27 . The charac-
ter’s description of Fabian as a stereotype goes beyond a pos-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 See the site of its French publisher, Indigène Éditions, for images of common examples: http://www.indigene-editions.fr/ 
[Nov 13, 2013]. Here, the two books by Hessel are considered as «protest bibles». See also the later comments on 
!i"ek’s The Sublime Object of Ideology (2009), specifically on the «liberal communists».  
27 Translated by the author. German original reads as: “Unser Gast, meine Damen und Herren, ist gar kein Schönge-
ist, sondern ein Schulmeister! [...] Er ist ein Moralist. Er ist ein Rationalist.” Kästner continues: “[...] untertan und 
zugetan den drei unveräußerlichen Forderungen: nach der Aufrichtigkeit des Empfindens, nach der Klarheit des 
Denkens und der Einfachheit in Wort und Satz.” Speech in front of PEN Club Zurich, 1957.  
!
! 19 
itive notion of moralism. Supplemented by a diffuse «rational» 
element, it rather focuses on the negative side of social-
criticism.  
 If we have a short look into the novel, we seem closer af-
filiated with Carlin than with Hessel: Kästner takes us on a 
journey through the «madhouse» of the Weimar Republic. We fol-
low Fabian’s desperate observations of the «cynic life». Walk-
ing through whorehouses, temples of commercialism and profit-
oriented newspaper agencies, he perceives the life around him 
as an «unjust structure» but does not believe in the good will 
of «the masses»28. He simply sees no reason (anymore) to inter-
vene. The more he informs himself the more he embitters. Fi-
nally, Fabian asks himself: “Where is the system in which I 
can function?” (Kästner 1976 [1931]: 42)29. It does not seem to 
exist. And because of its non-existence everything he observes 
makes no sense in the end. Fabian does not represent a warri-
or’s nature. The just ones and the sensible ones -- he might 
argue -- will never reach powerful positions: “hero Fabian en-
gages himself towards the maxim of reputability and reasona-
bility, without seeking practical consequences in his behav-
iour” (Bemman 1985: 171). 30  Helga Bemman notes that Kästner’s 
story of Fabian has to be seen in sharp contrast towards his 
other works: it does without any somehow conceivable happy 
end. 
 Fabian’s journey is a highly moralistic, (but) at the same 
disillusioning one. 31  In a comment on Fabian, Erich Kästner 
states that «the caricature» is the ultimate tool of a moral-
ist and adds with a sub-tone of melancholia: “If even that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 This term should indeed meant as being rich in content. It reminds the author on the critiques of «diffuse masses» 
within Elias Canetti’s Crowds and Power (1960) and Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of 
Evil (1963).  
29 Translated by the author. Original reads: “‘Wo ist das System, in dem ich funktionieren kann?’ fragt Fabian.” 
30 Translated by the author. Original reads: “Held Fabian bekennt sich zu der Maxime der Anständigkeit und 
Vernünftigkeit, ohne zu praktischen Konsequenzen in seiner Haltung zu kommen.” 
31 Erich Kästner’s initial title suggestion was Der Gang vor die Hunde. Admittedly, the publishing house vetoed this title 
and censored its most politically biting and amorally obscene parts (which included scenes of aristocrat’s paid 
group sex with infants). The more it should be seen as a fruitful side note in the following thoughts on the dog-
philosophers in chapter 2. Later, the potted book was published in English under the title Going to the dogs: The Story 
of a Moralist (NYRB 2008). Kästner’s unabridged original version was not published before October 2013. As of 
recently, Der Gang vor die Hunde is available through the distribution of Atrium Verlag, Zurich.   
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does not work, nothing works anymore. The case that nothing 
works anymore... -- back then and nowadays: no rarity” (Käst-
ner 1976 [1931]: 5). 32  In a conversation between Fabian and a 
secondary character, we find a theme that astoundingly fits 
our previous reflections on published opinion and media criti-
cism:  
 
One influences the public opinion more effectively with short reports than with 
long articles, but most effectively with publishing neither one nor another. Still, the 
most convenient public opinion is the public lack of all opinion (Kästner 1976 [1931]: 
23).33 
 
From this sheer negative and apathetic perspective it is not 
far away from a fully dis disillusioned view. With the purpose 
to find the most appropriate stereotype description for the 
public phenomenon George Carlin, our third character in the 
cabinet of social-critics will darken the atmosphere even 
more. And yet, he will somehow moderate between Stéphane the 
activist and Fabian the moralist. It is the refusing «anti» 
attitude and a stance of common refusal that describe both, 
Fabian and Carlin. But Carlin is not lacking in drive. As op-
posed to Fabian, he takes the initiative: He uses the open 
stage to speak (and shout out) his criticism. To clarify the 
fine distinction it helps to recapitulate Beggini’s distinc-
tion between «outlook» and «behaviour» (Baggini 2013: 3). 
While Carlin’s attitude seems to fit Fabian’s «outlook», it is 
somehow closer to Stéphane’s «go-out/into-the-public behav-
iour». What we search for is a third character that is both: 
active but full of distrust: someone that is filled up with 
too much rage for being a positive positivist of the meta sys-
tem around us, but also with enough courage for not being a 
negative negator of all forms of initiative within it. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Translated by the author. Original reads: “Wenn auch das nicht hilft, dann hilft überhaupt nichts mehr. Dass über-
haupt nichts hilft, ist – damals wie heute: keine Seltenheit.” 
33 Translated by the author. Original reads: “Man beeinflusst die öffentliche Meinung mit Meldungen wirksamer als 
durch Artikel, aber am wirksamsten dadurch, dass man weder das eine noch das andere bringt. Die bequemste 
öffentliche Meinung ist noch immer die öffentliche Meinungslosigkeit.” 
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[C] Sinclair the mocker 
This, finally, is the metier of the biting satirist. Although 
harshly criticizing his fellow citizens and the institutions 
around, the satirist proves to be successful in taking up in 
the very same environment: the very same people and systems 
s/he seems to refuse guarantee her/his 34  existence through their 
role of consumers or at least inspiring work models. The 
shortly presented stereotypical figure will be named after 
Sinclair Lewis. In a hymn of praise, Vernon Louis Parrington 
called Lewis -- one of the loudest and harshest American so-
cial-critics at that time -- Our Own Diogenes (Parrington 1973 
[1927]). The similarity towards the Ancient name-giver will be 
elaborated in the following chapter. So far, it is enough to 
focus on Parrington’s justification to call him as such: 
 
His irrepressible satire belongs to a new school. He has studied the technique of the 
realists, and under the beguiling pretence of telling the truth objectively and dispas-
sionately, he insists on revealing to us unaccommodated mass as a poor, bare, 
forked animal, who [...] persists in thinking himself a monstrous clever fellow (Par-
rington 1973 [1927]: 7). 
 
His style, so Stuart Pratt Sherman in 1922, “[...] can be 
treated with that ‘mixture of love and wit’, which Thackeray 
declares is the essence of humour” (Sherman 1971 [1922]: 3). 
Without deeper investigating Lewis’ work here, the descrip-
tions of Sherman and Parrington allow us to create the picture 
of someone that uses his rage as a motor of activity rather 
than restraint. What Lewis notices is “a land of material 
abundance” in which “the good life is reduced to being meas-
ured in commissions and percentages; civilization comes to 
flower in the broker; the mahogany desk is the altar at which 
we sacrifice in a land of triumphant materialism” (Lewis; cit. 
Parrington 1973 [1927]: 13). This Sinclair Lewis clearly no-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Throughout the analysis, terms such as «s/he» should read as a quite helpless, partly ironical try to overcome the 
enforced gender bias: The thesis in hand does indeed mainly focus on: men, men, men. Beginning with the thoughts of 
a male sociologist, the father (sic) of peace studies, three male philosophers will be applied on three male Kabarett art-
ists. This selection is more than random: It would indeed be interesting to investigate the fact that the clear majori-
ty of TV Kabarett work is done by male actors. This is aggravated by the fact that the seven abovementioned fig-
ures do all fulfil the classic notion of a white, left middle-class intellectual as it is «typical» for the addressed milieu.   
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tices cultural and structural violence around himself. As a 
reaction, he starts to mock society; -- Sinclair the mocker: 
 
Mr. Lewis is a good hater, but, contrary to the common rumour, he is not all com-
pact of antipathies. He has, I am convinced, a generalized conception of the Good, 
which, if he were a lyric poet, he could capture in a net of images (Sherman 1971 
[1922]: 6). 
 
In the end, the difference between our two prototype figures 
of negativity (Fabian and Sinclair) lies in their relation to-
wards society: While Fabian does not even try to get heard by 
anyone, Sinclair aims to confront the society directly. Other 
than Stéphane and the Occupy Movement, he does not perceive 
«the 1%» as root of the diverse forms of violence. He finally 
makes «the 99%» -- the mass -- discharging its duties.  
The mass; the crowd: this vocabulary stands out as one of 
the important phrases in our toolbox. In Crowd and Power, Eli-
as Canetti formed the notion of the double crowd: people are 
prone to think in notions of «us» and «them», «99%» and «1%». 
Main divisions seem to take place in a two-fold notion (with a 
wink, one might highlight the distinct disparity towards the 
peaceful three-fold peace models) such as «men» and «women», 
«the living» and «the dead», «thesis» and «antithesis». The 
sphere of violence always inhabits a more or less outspoken 
notion of the winning top-dog on the one hand and the losing 
under-dog on the other. The more invisible violence gets, the 
more blurred the suffering of the latter might be. It is the 
task of the social-critic to question violence although it 
might appear in the frame of normality.  
 
On the questioner the effect is a feeling of enhanced power. He enjoys this and 
consequentially asks more and more questions; every answer he receives is an act of 
submission. Personal freedom consists largely in having a defence against ques-
tions. The most blatant tyranny is the one which asks the most blatant questions 
(Canetti 1984 [1960]: 285). 
 
Canetti thinks the unreflective space, the egalitarian area of  
“it-is-ok-how-it-is” as most blatant tyranny. In this way, he 
transforms into the ideal Sinclair. The radical social-critic 
!
! 23 
takes the questioning to the extreme: S/He aims to uncover the 
most brutal nature of violence. Again, and again the question 
must arise: Why does structural, cultural, and direct violence 
take place? Again: cui bono? What is to blame? Is it the «us»? 
The most visible form of violence is war. Put in such a 
frame, war happens and takes place everywhere. Elias Canetti 
reduces the final goal of any war activity to the following 
greedy narrative: War occurs as the aim to transform an enemy 
crowd into a heap of dead. Each side would wish to be a larger 
living crowd than the other. The remarkable duration of wars 
would derive from their origin in crowds, for all crowds wish 
to persist and to grow (Canetti 1984 [1960]: 68).35 
Statements like this go beyond the positive notion of “the 
Good” within humanity. They seem to reduce human action on an 
unchangeable nature that is in its core bad. Human beings, to 
put is simply, are doomed. It is this desperate and melanchol-
ic background-notion that makes Fabian Fabian. This, mixed 
with a good portion of bounce-back-ability makes Sinclair Sin-
clair. Our mocker, by implication, stands as a representative 
for Walter Benjamin’s notion “the leftist melancholy” (Hier-
holzer 1990: 9). Benjamin noticed in Kurt Tucholsky, one of 
the most famous German Sinclairs, “the view that man’s un-
changeable nature ultimately prevents any transformation of 
society” (Hierholzer 1990: 10). Such as Norway’s most notable 
Sinclair -- Knut Hamsun --, Kurt Tucholsky used biting satire 
as a proper tool of the social-critic’s communication with the 
public that he loves and hates at the same time. Other than 
Fabian’s resignation, the love-hate relationship involves a 
maximum of social empathy.  
 At the same time, biting satire and black humour are prone 
to be misunderstood. The crucial social-critique, so to say, 
is put into a cipher of «nothing is as it seems». In this way, 
the world «that does not make sense anymore» is reflected by 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 The original version reads as follows: “In Kriegen geht es ums Töten [...]. Es geht um ein Töten in Haufen. 
Möglichst viele Feinde werden niedergeschlagen; aus der gefährlichen Masse von lebenden Gegnern soll ein Hau-
fen von Toten werden” Masse und Macht (1960: 75), translated: Crowds and Power (1984: 68). 
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language -- the wor(l)d’s synapsis -- that does not do either. 
This cipher, however, is in need of a recipient who feels the 
same: Someone that understands the sad «oh no» out of the ap-
parently amusing «yay». Someone that reads mental underload 
out of an apparent mental overload. A classic example of the 
complexity of mistreatment of sarcasm and mockery can be 
looked up in the diverse literature on education. In 1928, for 
example, a highly sophisticated «experimental analysis» by 
Thomas Briggs “suggest(s) means that may be used by supervi-
sors [here: namely teachers] to prevent sarcasm and to remedy 
any bad effects” (Briggs 1928: 685) and raises alarm: 
 
The data give little comfort to those who may argue that sarcasm is occasionally 
justifiable. They show clearly that sarcasm even to one who may deserve it is far 
more likely to harm others than to do good to the individual (Briggs 1928: 694). 
 
This piece of education theory’s history reveals a basic prob-
lem: confronted with Canetti’s most blatant tyranny, the bit-
ing social-critic -- let it be, as in this case, a teacher -- 
might find her/his only escape from the positivist «madhouse» 
around her/him in articulating her/his probably just aim with the 
psycholinguistics of sarcasm. But instead of being perceived 
as an «eye-opener», s/he might be characterized as a «hater».   
Yet, there seems to be hope to think critical (peace) edu-
cation in terms of mockery. Almost 60 years after Briggs comes 
Gibbs: In an analysis that combines both, psycholinguistics 
and the academic’s reflection on knowledge transfer, Raymond 
Gibbs rehabilitates our Sinclair as a teacher of life: “[...] 
experiments examining memory for sarcasm showed that sarcasm 
was remembered much better than literal uses of the same ex-
pressions of non-sarcastic equivalents” (Gibbs 1986: 3). That 
leads us to the final question: Who, then, is the cynic?  
 
============================= 
1.3  A-B-C: Who is the cynic? 
============================= 
 
After we got to know the three stereotypical figures Stéphane, 
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Fabian and Sinclair with their different reaction towards 
three conceptualized forms of violence -- all being described 
as social-critics of somehow perceived systematic aberrations 
within the «game of society» --, we now risk a short look on 
the societies notion on the «cynic within the game». In a fur-
ther consequent dependence on Galtung, this will be done on 
the basis of three global representatives of contemporary’s 
Cultural Hegemony.36   
 
[A] The stock market manager 
The story of [A] begins with the birth into an upper middle-
class family. After visiting a prestigious, private high 
school, s/he studies at a well known «Master of Business Admin-
istration» programme with the financial counter value of a 
single-family home and completes her/his studies with a work on 
«smart human resource control management». Based on her/his rad-
ical human potential savings model formula («two should work 
for three by earning the half») s/he receives a summa cum laude 
and a high-paid position as a trader at one of the biggest 
banking houses in the world. To secure decent quarterly fig-
ures, the company applies her/his «smart» human capital model to 
classify 3289 employees into [A]’s specially designed «catego-
ry 4b»: highly ineffective for further progress according to 
the formula. All of them receive an instant dismissal. The 
company’s market cap grows onto a 14-months-hight. After a 
successful promotion within the company, [A] focuses on the 
increasing trade with basic foods. The media uses the case of 
[A] to portray the image of a «greedy manager» while emotion-
ally contrasting her/his behaviour with «the suffering of mil-
lions of people in Latin America and Asia» through prohibitive 
prices on wheat and rice. «The society», the public opinion 
characterizes [A] as being «cynical». Our Sinclair would have 
replied: «Yes, indeed.» 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 The author hopes to do justice to Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (1935) while portraying «the stock market man-
ager» (top-dog), «the Mc Donald’s employee» (under-dog) and «the mocking satirist» (the dog) as the prototypes of 
our contemporary’s Cultural Hegemony (Gramsci), the age of global neoliberalism and market radicalism. 
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[B] The Mc Donald’s employee  
The story of [B] begins with the birth into a middle-class 
family. After visiting a private high school with good reputa-
tion, s/he studies at a popular «Peace and Conflict research» 
programme. With the aim to refinance some conveniences -- a 
car, a centrally located flat, a round trip through Thailand -
- s/he decides to work at Mc Donald’s besides studying although 
«not directly supporting» certain food policies and work prac-
tises of the global franchise chain.  
Karfakis and Kokkinidis (2011) discuss the paradox that a 
somehow indifferent attitude at the workplace can be seen as 
profitable for a big concern. Instead of lateral thinking and 
scrutinizing, ignorance might be seen as a profitable driving 
force: They describe acts of disengagement from the organiza-
tional values as a fruitful reinforcement of the individual’s 
commitment to the organization and use the story of [B] as a 
metaphorical image for this kind of attitude: “The cynical 
worker of McDonalds might be wearing a ‘McShit’ tee-shirt un-
der her uniform, attempting in this way to dis-identify her-
self from the organization’s values, but still performs as an 
efficient member of her team” (Karfakis/Kokkinidis 2011: 333). 
Drawing on Fleming and Spicer (2003)37, this example nicely il-
lustrates how «silent» dis-identification is able to prevent a 
self-defeating form of resistance. Slavoj Žižek -- whose 
thoughts on the topic will be part of the latter analysis --
described the behaviour of the «Mc Shit employee» not only as 
archetypical within globally established (thus impersonal, ra-
ther imaginary) companies; but also within “every sphere of 
social life” (Žižek 1989: 32). Around the same time, in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s critical sociology debates, George 
Ritzer (1993) and Benjamin R. Barber (1992) established the 
terms «McDonaldization of Society» and «Mc World» respective-
ly. Under such umbrella terms, Barber outlined his thoughts of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Peter Fleming and Andre Spicer were the first ones to think the «cynical employee» as a «dis-identifying» but «func-
tional performer» within the organization theory. Their work ‘Working at a cynical distance: Implications for power, 
subjectivity and resistance’, Organization 10:1, 157-179, co-opts the employee’s refusing of power as a power tool. 
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contemporary, especially Western, consumerist societies while 
highlighting «forces» that would demand integration and uni-
formity 
 
[...] and that mesmerize the world with fast music, fast computers, and fast food—
with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald’s, pressing nations into one commercially ho-
mogenous global network: one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, 
communications, and commerce [...] (Barber 1992: 53).  
 
As did Samuel Huntington in his well-elaborated, contemporane-
ous theory of the Clash Of Civilisations (1993), Barber postu-
lated a possible «clash scenario» between a Western McWorld 
and an anti-Western Jihad movement. In his opinion, both cate-
gories could stand representatively for a dichotomous World 
Order that would continuously erode and undermine -- what he 
indirectly calls -- «real democratic structures» on two front 
lines. Both grouping concepts formed the later, considerably 
catchy title Jihad Vs. McWorld in which Barber formulates the 
sceptical symbiosis in which “the planet is falling precipi-
tantly apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same 
moment” (Barber 1992: 54; emphasis in original). 
In this shady light, Žižek states that a denying consciousness 
full of ignorance, rather than a lack of knowledge, has become 
the ideological force in our late modern societies. This is 
what he calls «ideological fantasy»: “even if we do not take 
things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are 
still doing them” (Žižek 1989: 32).  
This leads Karfakis and Kokkinidis 38  to think dis-
identification as a success of «organizational control» in-
stead of an imperfection of this control. The silent Mc-Shit 
statement, as Peter Bloom would put it, allows the disillu-
sioned subject “the moral high ground of internal dissent 
without the added obligation of revolutionary or reforming ac-
tion” (Bloom 2008: 12). «The society», the public opinion 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Who, as fruitful background knowledge, both work for the «Leicester School of Management», which the author sees 
as comparable with the earlier mentioned, somehow schizophrenic, «poststructuralist approaches» within «Man-
agement Accounting & Control Systems» at Queen’s School of Business: Cultural Hegemony as its best. 
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characterizes [B] as being «not cynical». Sinclair, however 
would have replied: «No; [B] is cynical.»39 
 
[C] The biting satirist 
In an essay with the meaningful title Who Names The World With 
What Consequences40, Robert Arnove presents us an insight into 
the Theory of Bullshit: 
  
There is a game that more critically-minded academics play when they go to meet-
ings (from the local to the international) when they hear such buzz words as those 
mentioned by Steve—donor harmonization, knowledge management, and country ownership 
as well as strategic plans, outcomes-based management, accountability, quality control, metrics, 
poverty reduction strategy papers and so on. It’s called ‘bullshit bingo’ (Arnove 2009: 
128).  
 
Character [C] could be imagined as one of them. While swimming 
within the system to a certain degree (receiving a decent edu-
cation at a university; working within the public state sec-
tor), the prototype of [C] does not seem to accept (social) 
injustices or dislocations with a silent protest on a hidden 
t-shirt but rather prefers to speak out his criticism loud. 
Arnove continues to present the game as such: “As soon as the 
words on the Bingo sheet are filled up, members of the audi-
ence stand-up and yell Bingo! — often to the surprise of the 
speaker” (Arnove 2009: 128). In doing so, the imagined figure 
seems to neglect the most essential (work) hierarchies around 
her/him. This kind of mockery and cheekiness might be accepted 
as long as this figure is conceived to be somehow weird or 
clownish instead of dangerous or system-threatening.  
This, nevertheless, exactly is the hidden métier of the 
«biting satirist»: the more biting her/his approach might be, 
the more anti-systemic thought is able to filter through such 
power-refusing action. The anecdote of the bullshit bingo does 
not lead to a convincing description of [C] alone. But it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 The critical examination of the McDonald’s business model and its adaption on a wider «neoliberal society» within 
sociology and a somehow left progressive public debate seems to be a common-place access to make invisible struc-
tures visible. See, for example, Le Monde Diplomatique Norway’s lead story for February 2014 (6-8): «McFattigdom». 
Already 20 years ago, the sociologist George Ritzer (1993) established the term «McDonaldization of Society». 
40 The title nicely consorts with McDermott’s What We Think We Know And Why (2004) and Luhmann 2000 (p. 1). 
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functions as a symptom. Limited to certain frames of the sys-
tem that s/he tries to mock on, the ‘biting satirist’ might 
find her/his role in the work of a jester. Images 4 and 5 stand 





Image 4| Jan Matejko, 1862. Stanczyk, 1514: The court jester seems to be    Image 5| Jan Matejko, 1892.  
the only person at a royal ball who is troubled by current political events.    Self portrait.  
 
Within the Polish popular culture, the figure of Stańczyk sym-
bolizes the prototype of a court jester. Like the German pen-
dant Eulenspiegel, Stańczyk could use her/his role as court-
accepted humourist to criticise political dislocations in 
front of the actors who were to blame: the functional and sys-
temic elite of that time. Jan Matejko, whoms self-portrait 
from 1892 (image 5) seems to be highly influenced by her/his 30 
years older Stańczyk painting (1862; image 4), portrays two 
disillusioned, rather melancholic figures. The ones who ‘did 
not get’ Stańczyk’s and Matejko’s criticism, would declassify 
them as a funny comedian and a positive artist; the ones ‘who 
did’ would shout: bitter cynics!   
No matter which factual constraints have to been taken in-
to account, Kurt Tucholsky describes the work of satire as 
such as a throughout negative business. In What Is Permitted 
To Satire, he calls for any action that “bites, laughs, whis-
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tles, and beats the great colourful battle-drum against all 
stagnation and sluggishness” (Tucholsky 1919; transl. Hier-
holzer 1990: 21). Whoever would blurry the concepts of sheer 
fun and comedy with the sphere of social-criticism would un-
dermine the seriousness of a clear-pointed skepticism: “Noth-
ing betrays lack of character more quickly, nothing demon-
strates more rapidly the conscienceless clownishness of some-
one who attacks this person today and tomorrow that” (Tu-
cholsky 1919; transl. Hierholzer 1990: 21). In a way, the pop-
ular characterization of a social-critic’s work as being cyni-
cal must be seen as an appreciation: it consists of radical 
meaning. On the other hand, the satirist is anything but a 
cynic. The cynic arranges with the existing, systemic state of 
affairs, while the satirist wants to jolt. “The satirist” -- 
explains Tucholsky -- “is a wounded idealist. He wants the 
world to be good, but it is bad, and he combats such badness” 
(cit. Hierholzer 1990: 25). 
Back to Bingo! It is not the Bullshit Bingo alone that 
leads the common audience to describe [C] as a ‘cynic’. It is 
her/his whole appearance. Based on a demonstrated lack of confi-
dence in the own ability to influence the state of affairs in 
a perceived world gone mad, [C] openly announces that s/he con-
siders any individual action useless. But instead of giving 
up; instead of vanishing from the public sphere such as Fabi-
an, the biting satirist uses the tool of elegant provocation -
- and all that remains is the hollow laugh of the wo/man on the 
gallows: 
 
The only weapon of the modern satirist is the continued production of satiric mate-
rial, and the most prominent message seems to be that the next generation is unde-
niably worth protection and salvation. Even if there is no hope for an audience 
“sophisticated enough” to enjoy “wit, imagination and the graces of literature” and 
their application to “serious topics”, then laughter as a primal expression can still be 
used as an alternative (Aanensen 2011: 89). 
 
But not even such exorbitance of laughter is able to unveil 
the deeply pessimistic world view of the satirist. No matter, 
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which human-made topic s/he is investigating in, s/he encounters 
something that s/he might interpret as errors of man in diverse 
shapes or forms. “In the end, satire is an exploration of hu-
manity”, argues Mariette Aanensen, and adds that the satirist 
has to define her/his task in seeking to convey such “errors” 
(Aanensen 2011: 19) -- willingly or not. «The society», the 
public opinion, characterizes [C] as being «cynical». Sin-
clair, however would have replied: «No; [C] is not cynical.» 
From now on, we will call our Sinclair, the biting satirist, 
Diogenes. 
Finally, the previously used terms moralism, skepticism, 
gallows humour and biting satire can be thought together. They 
give a hint towards a further conceptualisation of counter-
cynic cynicism and will lead us towards a reflection on Kyni-
cism with /K/. After an introducing threefold circular tour -- 
from violence [A] and [B] to violence [C]; from reaction [A] 
and [B] to reaction [C]; and from character [A] and [B] to 
character [C], it is time to investigate into the research 
question: Is it fruitful to characterise satirical behaviour 
in terms of Kynicism? If so: Is it fruitful to characterise 
Kynical behaviour in terms of peace activism? Do we find spe-
cific fields of contemporary Kynicism? Does Kynic peace activ-
ism function as one of such métiers of the modern Diogenes? In 
the following, the work of Kabarett will be shortly presented 
as a possibly fruitful approach to such satirical endeavour.  
After extensively investigating the three-fold thoughts of 
one thinker (Johan Galtung; colourized in yellow, green, and 
red) and causal derivations from the phenomena of the diverse 
experience of «violence», it is then time to literally set a 
inverse mode: In the following, the remarks of three thinkers 
will be bundled to one coherent thought: the Kynic inversion. 
First, we concentrate on its inherent meta-inversion:  













































Conscious considerations: Satirical Mockery, Society,  




«What is a cynic?» asked Cecil Graham.  
«A man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing», 
said Lord Darlington. 
–– Oscar Wilde, 1892: Lady Windermere’s Fan.  
 
«You are very cynical», said Lord Mannering, looking at her with curiosity.  
«No, I only state facts»,  
said Mrs Elwood. 
–– Mabel Collins, 1893: Juliet’s Lovers. 
 
«You are very cynical», said Lady Locke, flicking the pony's fat white back with the whip. 
«All intelligent people are. Cynicism is merely the art of seeing things as they are  
instead of as they ought to be.»  
–– Robert Hichens, 1894: The Green Carnation. 
 
It was the moment when we spoke about the principles of peace 
education, when I asked myself: through which influences did I 
begin to think in a reflective way on such wide topics such as 
war, peace, and its (in)direct relationship towards our very 
own lifestyles? Who (understood as: which institutions; which 
individuals) did influence me to what extent? Sure, I used the 
common information channels to inform myself about politics. 
Moreover, I was quite satisfied with the political education 
at my school. But there was a third, more critical «political 
education» that aroused my interest and later influenced many 
of my understandings of societal relationships: political 
Kabarett programs.  
These stood in sharp contrast towards the faithful study 
of institutions that I saw myself confronted with in the 
sphere of political science. Enriched with deep skepticism to-
wards positivist models on «Just War» or «Humanitarian Inter-
ventions»; the role of the nation-state as guarantor of secu-
rity and its seemingly natural role as a unit of organizing 
cultural and societal life, many Kabarett artists seemed to 
«speak out what I felt». In my opinion, this enigma was reason 
enough, to focus on it in a scientific way. Since the work of 
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political Kabarett is a rather unknown side issue, the thesis 
aims to be a voyage of exploration. How fruitful might the 
work of political Kabarett be? What, strictly speaking, is the 
work of political Kabarett? It did not take long until the 
feuilleton described Hagen Rether -- a quite ‘radical’ German 
Kabarett artist -- as the «prototype of a cynic». Similar to 
George Carlin (nowadays’ Sinclair Lewis) in the USA or Knut 
Nærum (nowadays’ Knut Hamsun) in Norway, the societies’ most 
radical counter-cynic seemed to function as a figurehead of 
«cynicism itself». In my opinion, this was reason enough to 
focus on what is meant by the term cynicism. 
How to discover #$%&'µ()? What I saw on the stage was some-
one that seemed to be highly critical towards the lifestyle of 
-- what he considered as -- the «Western world societies» on 
the costs -- thus, the suffering -- of others. Far away from a 
commercialized comedy that would formulate its primary purpose 
as cheerful, joky entertainment, biting Kabarett seems to fall 
closer in such categories as meta-critical pamphlets. The fol-
lowing extract should briefly illuminate this point:   
 
Mexico? I don’t know anything about it. Well, I know that they starve because they 
cannot bake Tortillas anymore, since the corn price is being speculated too high. 
Our fat stock in Germany gets that shit. And the rest of it is being used as fuel: 
‘Oh, damn… the mineral oil is getting scarce soon. What should we use for tanking 
up our cars then?’ – ‘Mhh… let us maybe tank up groceries!’ – ‘Oh, good idea! But 
not our groceries… mhhh, maybe their groceries?’ – ‘Well, sure! It also was their 
mineral oil, moron!’ (Rether 2011: 0:12:36).  
 
But what exactly let people describe the work of biting satire 
as «cynicism»? According to the common understanding41, a per-
son might be considered as such if s/he acts selfish, ignores 
basic moral attitudes and fulfils more or less exactly the at-
tributes that actors like Carlin or Rether criticize in a 
harsh manner. One look into the philosophical movement of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 Surely, the postulated, all-embracing argument «common understanding» lacks far-reaching evidence. Nevertheless, 
a short look into Nunn 1989 and into Mazella 2007 might be helpful here. Sam Nunn formulates A Common-Sense 
Definition of «Common Understanding», while David Mazella investigates The Making of Modern Cynicism from Ancient 
roots into a contemporary selfish, rather nihilist, attitude: “When we think about cynicism, we usually think of it as 
a reaction to the latest political scandal [...][– but...]” (Mazella 2007: 1). 
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Kynicism42 might be a fruitful escape from the conceptual con-
fusion: In the 1980s, Peter Sloterdijk, Michel Foucault, and 
Slavoj Žižek rediscovered43 a school of (practical) philosophi-
cal thought that seemed to be forgotten a long time ago: the 
Ancient Kynics and their most recognizable figure, Diogenes of 
Sinope. Besides the definitions of -- and distinctions between 
-- Kynicism (German: Kynismus) and cynicism (German: Zynismus) 
(Sloterdijk 1983), a rather popular scientific debate arose on 
Kynic virtues such as parrhesia, the conceptualization of 
Greek free speech (Foucault 1984), and the inversion of Marx-
ism (Žižek 1989). Slavoj Žižek used the concept of #$%&'µ(), 
Kynicism, to formulate his ideology criticism. As it will be 
shown in terms of a sketchy reference, the work of biting, sa-
tirical Kabarett stands out as a good illuminating example for 
the application of Kynic terms in contemporary times. 
Three theoretical cornerstones from Sloterdijk, Foucault, 
and Žižek will be essential for the analysis. They all have 
their roots within the philosophical Kynicism, but transfer 
the Ancient concept into the contemporary time. In a reader’s 
comment on the earlier mentioned article «In praise of cyni-
cism» one can read the following distinction between skepti-
cism on the one hand and cynicism on the other: to be skepti-
cal would mean to be “marked by or given to doubt; question-
ing: e.g. a skeptical attitude; skeptical of political promis-
es” (Baggini 2013: 3).  To be cynical, then, would be equalized 
with “the belief that people are motivated chiefly by base or 
selfish concerns” (ibidem). Thus, the first approach is seen 
as positive and rational, the basis of an Enlightenment-
inspired intelligent thought. The concept of cynicism, on the 
other hand, finds itself limited to an unthinking, unreflec-
tive negativity that illuminates nothing. The task of the fol-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 The attribution of the Ancient philosophical Kynics as ‘school’ must be seen controversial; some research uses the 
umbrella term ‘group’ instead: see Niehues-Pröbsting 1988 [1979].  
43 The set phrase “rediscovered” should point to a rediscovery within the sphere of wider, popular research. Niehues-
Pröbsting 1988 [1979] must be seen as a precursor of contemporaries’ – though initially very limited – studies on 
Kynicism. In his introduction towards the ninth lecture of his later mentioned series The Government of Self and Others 
at the Collège de France in 1983/1984, Michel Foucault names Niehues-Pröbsting 1979 as a major source. 
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lowing section will be to show that this simplification is no 
longer maintainable.  
One first hint on the complexity of the term #$%&'µ() could 
be a focus on its semantic structure in different languages. A 
comparison between the English, the Norwegian, and the German 
translation out of the Greek reveals an interesting insight. 
In English, /c/ynicism is used for both, the Ancient school of 
philosophy and the contemporary notion of a selfish behaviour. 
Within the academic debate, many scholars decided to use capi-
tal letters to distinguish the Ancient /C/ynicism 44  from the 
modern /c/ynicism, whereas in Norwegian this distinction has 
not been made. Nevertheless, the Norwegian translation reveals 
another interesting point: Instead of using a sharp /c; s; z/, 
the Norwegian term begins with a /k/. Both, the philosophical 
movement and the modern meaning are described with kynisme. On 
the other hand, the German language uses a distinct form for 
each case: whereby Kynismus [/K/] describes the philosophy of 
Kyon, the dog, the Cynic; Zynismus [/Z/] stands for the modern 
understanding of a Zyniker, the selfish person; the cynic.  
 
English*   /c/ynicism    versus /c/ynicism  c   (C) c 
French  /c/ynisme    versus /c/ynisme  c    = c 
Spanish /c/inismo    versus /c/inismo  c    = c 
Esperanto /c/inikismo    versus /c/inikismo  c    = c 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Norwegian /k/ynisme    versus /k/ynisme  k    = k 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Turkish /k/inizm    versus /s/inizm  k   s 
German /K/ynismus    versus /Z/ynismus   K   Z 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
*Alternative /K/ynicism    versus /c/ynicism  k   (K) c 
 
 Table 1| On #$%&'µ(): Linguistic differentiation between Ancient and contemporary form.45 
 
Scholars such as Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting (1988 [1979]), and 
later also Michel Foucault, pointed out that -- curiously 
enough -- research on Cynicism was mainly limited towards the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Here, the usage of upper-case characters is comparable with the naming of the academic discipline «International 
Relations» in order to distinguish it from international relations as such. 
45 The content of table 1 was carried together by the author. Throughout the thesis, the Ancient «Kynicism» will be 
written in capitals, whereas the contemporary «cynicism» will be not. 
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German-speaking world.46 The city of Sinope, origin of Diogenes 
the Kynic (sic), is located in nowadays’ Turkey. This would 
explain why the same distinction is still being made in the 
modern Turkish language. The popular rediscovery of Kynic 
thought by Sloterdijk lead also some English-speaking scholars 
to distinguish between /K/ and /c/: The translation of Cri-
tique of Cynical Reason draws on such a distinction by pur-
pose. This thesis will do so as well. 
 
========================================================= 
2.1  Cynicism with /c/: Elementary empirical explorations 
========================================================= 
 
Kynically spoken, cynicism is everything that surrounds us. 
One might take any random example of contemporary peace re-
search to illustrate this point. Between 2011 and 2013, for 
example, the so-called Syrian civil war dominated and still 
dominates the media coverage. (i) First, the concept of war as 
such can be perceived as cynic action. As we will see later, 
Peter Sloterdijk lists the term «military cynicism» as one of 
the major cynic forms. Many might consider that «the first 
casualty of war is truth»; or to put it in other words: the 
first thing that dies in war is the truth. 47  A counter-cynic 
would put it different: S/He would highlight that «the truth»48 
must have already died long before any action of war could oc-
cur. Clearly we have to take divergent assumptions of the nat-
ural state into account: Do human beings act bad; just for the 
purpose of it? Or is the one’s perception of the «bad» just 
the other’s perception of the good? Most prominently stands 
the phrase: One’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. And 
vice versa. In other words: is any direct violent action 
thinkable in which the ‘aggressive’ violator does not perceive 
her/his action as somehow justifiable? Even in the case of the -
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 See chapter 3. 
47 Please see The Guardian’s Debate: Who coined the phrase «The First Casualty of War is Truth» for a debate on the origins 
of this statement. URL:  http://www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries/query/0,5753,-21510,00.html [Nov 11, 2013] 
48 How this very vulnerable term might be used remains most essential. We will come back to that in chapter 3.  
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- what might be normatively described as -- worst humanitarian 
crimes that occur(ed) throughout the history of mankind, one 
should allow oneself the simple thought: Could it be that also 
the worst of the worst acted within their very own sense sys-
tem that could justify their -- again, normatively perceived -
- brutal action? (ii) Second, how and why do we perceive «what 
is going on in Syria»49, sticking to this elementary example of 
current events. Especially within the sensitive field of peace 
studies, researchers and so called «experts of their field» 
are vulnerable when it comes to any confrontation of a somehow 
perceived «reality» with sophisticated philosophical terms 
such as «justice», «moral», and so on. Also, and especially 
academic agents and political actors sometimes don’t know; but 
their professional stand seems to obligate them to know. As a 
matter of fact, they have to make sense of the system they 
live in and have to enable others (students; citizens; follow-
ers; readers; listeners) to do so as well. The same mature and 
responsible person who learns through BBC (UK), CNN (USA), Al 
Jazeera (Qatar) and Al Arabiya (Saudi Arabia) that «not every-
thing should be considered as black-white; but still: Assad 
[the personified symbol; the symbolised person] is the tyrant» 
would learn through RT (Russia), PressTV (Iran), CCTV (China) 
and teleSur (Latin America) that «not everything should be 
considered as black-white; but still: the Takfir [the p.s.; 
the s.p.] is the tyrant». 
This example simplifies. Because simplifying lies in the 
nature of such illustrating examples. At the same time, cyni-
cism (with c) just lies in the nature of violence. The more 
visible violence gets, the more visible its inherent cynicism 
gets. Therefore, many other (occasionally simplifying) exam-
ples of «military cynicism» could be found. One could, for ex-
ample, focus on the official casus belli of the last major 
«defensive», «just» and «humanitarian» interventions. In 1990, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Here, the author uses the expression «going on…» – to be understood as a common news filler text – on purpose.  
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the Nayirah testimony50 -- the claim that Saddam Hussein’s sol-
diers stole baby incubators out of a hospital in Kuwait and 
let the babies die -- convinced the last senators and the pub-
lic to favour the Gulf War. The claim turned out to be falsi-
fied. The military involvement took place. Ten years after, a 
direct line between the 19 Saudi Arabian terrorists from 9/11 
was drawn towards Afghanistan and the Taliban regime. Up to 
now, this connection does not seem to convince, but the just 
intervention took place. George W. Bush announced: “The battle 
is now joined on many fronts. We will not waver, we will not 
tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail. Peace and 
freedom will prevail”. 51  He clearly fulfills the image of the 
proto-cynic. This, nevertheless, hides the fact that Bush just 
had to act according to a given role within the military-
industrial complex 52 : A role that any other president before 
him and any other after him played, plays, and will have to 
play. Not he himself is the cynic alone.  
 Another claim, in 2003, can be described as the main-
stream’s acceptance of «every war preparation involves its 
speculative moment»: the case Curveball, Powell’s Power Point 
presentation and the «evidenced» existence of weapons of mass 
destruction was insomuch suggestive and dishonest that even 
the broader public opinion in many Western countries turned 
against the cry for war. Nevertheless, the published opinion 
worked smooth and the intervention took place. The same can be 
said about the final claims before turning a non-fly zone over 
Libya into a hot war zone: Gaddafi’s soldiers were reportedly 
‘using Viagra for mass rape’; Gaddafi himself seemed to ’loose 
the credibility of his own people while massacring them’. In-
terestingly enough, the UN Human Rights Council and the Na-
tional Transitional Council published official victim esti-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 See Gottschalk 1992: Operation Desert Cloud: The Media and The Gulf War, World Policy Journal 9:3. 
51 This famous statement was raised in George W. Bush’s «Presidential Address to the Nation» on October 7, 2001. 
Cited in Bush 2003. 
52 Not without coincidence, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s concept of the military-industrial complex is being used through-
out the analysis. See Eisenhower’s «Farewell Address to the Nation» from January 17, 1961, at 08:15 of the 16 
minutes long speech: Eisenhower 2009.  
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mates of «tens of thousands being killed».53 In 2013, only two 
years after, such claims turned out to be untrue or exaggerat-
ed. Again and again, the basic model seems to be the same: a 
somehow enlightened, moral-infiltrated, liberal-democratic so-
ciety must be convinced to favour war; supporting any military 
action with the greatest asset: democratic will, filled by em-
pathy with «the suffering; the victims». 
 In the case of Kosovo, Slobodan Milošević was portrayed as 
the new Hitler. The Sun, for example, titled: “Serbian troops 
and paramilitary forces are slaughtering thousands, tens of 
thousands, even hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians. 
[...] The Serb cruelty has chilling echoes of the Holocaust” 
(cit. O’Neill 2012: 3; McLaughlin 1999). Not even after more 
than ten years of investigation, any evidence of such numbers 
can be found. The Holocaust narrative seemed to function as a 
plausible we-have-to-interact reasoning. Thus, the usage of 
this cynic narrative for waging cynic interventions has to be 
described as meta-cynic. No matter, if the published opinion 
speaks about Iraq or Iran; Libya or Syria; Kosovo or Kuwait. 
It always seems to be the blackmailed (d)evil her/himself (Hus-
sein; Gaddafi; Assad;...) that tends to «kill his own people». 
And we, the enlightened must act. Somehow. Until now, the 
claim that Bashar al-Assad’s troops used «chemical weapons» on 
August 21 against the «own population» is not evidenced.54  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 See for example The Guardian and The Huffington Post from September 8, 2011: “At least 30000 died in the war.” 
(Laub 2011a; 2011b). As well as in the case of the so-called Syrian civil war, the Qatari news channel Al Jazeera Eng-
lish took the role of a notoriously biased, but «neutral» framed news agent of a «truth setting» in which the pre-
dominantly foreign rebel forces were portrayed as freedom fighters and civilians full of rage (see for example Bertly 
2011). Due to its rather «investigative» role on the Iraq War coverage (as a counter voice towards the BBC/CNN 
frame), Al Jazeera English is still seen as a reliable source by many; even in the case of the Libya and Syria conflict 
coverage. As in the above mentioned The Guardian example, journalists from other news agencies as well as politi-
cal agents such as Cherif Bassioni and other head agents from the UN Human Right Council referred repeatedly to 
Al Jazeera projections, Al Jazeera itself referred repeatedly to exile Human Rights Observation Offices and The National 
Transitional Council – a media-agent-institution network that reminds in its packaging on the interwoven Syrian info-
tainment of AP/AFP, BBC/CNN, Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya linked on the policies of Syrian Observatory for Human 
Rights (SOHR) and Syrian National Council (SNC) and Free Syrian Army (FSA). 
54 Quite contrary, as of February 2014, prominent voices increase that neglect the official US States Department 
view. In December 2013, the prominent investigative journalist Seymour Hersh contested any «evidence» that 
would blame the Syrian government for the attacks in his leading article Whose Sarin? In January 2014, Richard 
Lloyd (MIT) and Theodore A. Postol (Tesla) falsified previous White House statements by means of a physical 
weapon character analysis within a detailed report titled Possible Implications of Faulty US Technical Intelligence in the Da-
mascus Nerve Agent Attack of August 21, 2013 that build on the previous Åke Sellström (UN) report in late 2013. 
!
! 41 
 Nevertheless, the published (and public) opinion seem(s) 
to be convinced: «Everything does speak for it.» Does it? And 
why? Cui bono? It is the same public that might be strongly 
convinced about an Iranian nuclear weapon programme. Sure, it 
did exist. But only until 1979; only until the Islamic Repub-
lic’s foundation and its holy fatwa ban. Keeping the cynic 
structure of any nuclear (also so called «peaceful») activity 
and the cynic structure of a religious-based society model -- 
enforced through force -- by side: Since then, a network out 
of academic (Heritage Foundation) and journalistic (The Econo-
mist) «experts» warn year by year that Iran «plans to build 
the atomic bomb» under «the pretext of a peaceful nuclear pro-
gramme». The last mentioned phrase could at least be noticed 
as a hint of investigative, neutral journalism. Not even the 
IAEA or the US Intelligence Community could find any evidence 
for such a weapon programme. One could go into detail and 
start to reflect on wrong citations that try to portray 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former president of Iran, as someone 
that aims to «wipe Israel off the map»55, «would kill the Jews» 
in a «new Holocaust»56. Sadly enough, all of these false stig-
matisations made their way into the canon of «enlightened 
peace education». Ten years after 2003, Powell’s citation “We 
have first-hand descriptions of biological weapons factories 
on wheels and on rails” (cit. McGoldrick 2004: 270) is widely 
recognized as cynic statement. Two years after 2011, Susan 
Rice’s comment “Gaddafi supplies troops with Viagra to encour-
age mass rape” (cit. MacAskill 2011) is widely recognized as 
cynic statement. Barack Obama’s statement: “There is very lit-
tle doubt at this point that a chemical weapon was used by the 
Syrian regime against civilians in this incident” (cit. Leigh 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 See Schramm 2010 for a Kabarett work that reflects on this wrong translation within certain media channels and 
certain newswires. See also Steele 2006. 
56 Well-established securitization nexus: «Mullah regime»-«Nuclear bomb»-«Israel attack». Tehran’s 2005 controversial 
conference A World Without Zionism can be read as a fire-starter of the current debate. Benjamin Netanyahu is 
known for a continues usage of the above mentioned securitization nexus, warning of a «New Holocaust». See his 
diction towards Iran within the Social Media setting, for example on https://twitter.com/netanyahu [Nov 11, 2013]. At 
the same time – and with the same required distance – the Facebook/Twitter/Instagram comments on Israel by the 
official profiles of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hassan Rouhani, and Ali Chamene’i are worth a read.  
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2013) could have received the same cynic notion if it would 
have been used as a casus belli. And it would have been used.  
 But still, what we focused on here is just the most basic, 
the most visible form of contemporary cynicism. All of these 
examples are just too easy to understand as contemporary (mil-
itary) cynicism. The real cynic structure behind is hidden. Of 
course, one could stick to the example of contemporary mili-
tary cynicism and find manifold hidden cynicisms that would be 
worth writing on. Obama’s statement could have led to a hot 
war «led by the coalition». This coalition does in fact supply 
military and structural help since March 2011. A simple google 
search on «Kafranbel», «Brown Moses» or «Alexia Jade»; or on 
the involvement of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, USA, Great 
Britain, France and Jordan might disillusion the last support-
er of an «Arab spring» twitter-freedom-facebook movement of 
the middle-class entrepreneurs -- and set reports on Iranian 
and Russian involvements into relation. «We» have the infor-
mation on everything, but still, we do not use it. It is al-
ways the «us» that tends to stand on the just site and ignores 
site-effects of an eternal cycle of action-reaction-action: 
Information for its own sake? Here the problem begins.  
 «We», the «enlightened» peace students; the «informed pub-
lic» might even have a good feeling to be involved in do-good 
NGOs and other help-the-world groups that shout out loud: Kill 
Kony 2012! Free Syria! Free Africa! Free Kuwait! Free Tibet! 
Free Libya! -- Free Pizza! But it is us who do fulfil the most 
cynic notion of a contemporary cynic. For sure, the stereo-
typed «generals» and «bankers» remain the best visible pupils 
in the class of the military-industrial complex. Meanwhile it 
is «us», the «99%», that stimulate and breast-feed Eisenhow-
er’s famous notion. «We» want to make career. «We» want to be 
somehow successful. As soon as we are confronted with social 
dislocations we aim to «change the system from within» -- if 
at all.  
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 In Violence, Slavoj Žižek (2009) introduces his term «lib-
eral communists’ charity». He takes the example of a classic 
do-good entrepreneur and asks for the hidden motivation of 
changing the world through charity. Al Gore, the Dalai Lama or 
Bill Gates could function as top-of-the-class in such a frame: 
Žižek speaks about two faces that could parallel the two faces 
of Soros: “The cruel businessman” as a figure of our time 
would destroy or buy out competitors, would aim at virtual mo-
nopoly, and employ all the tricks of the trade to achieve 
her/his goals. Žižek portrays the other face of Soros as such: 
Described by the main magazines as «greatest philanthropist in 
the history of mankind», the businessman would quaintly 
[Žižek] and kindly [the author] ask: “What does it serve to 
have computers, if people do not have enough to eat and are 
dying of dysentery?” (Žižek 2009: 18). Žižek lets us unveil 
contemporaries’ cultural hegemony. He removes the nice façade 
of the capitalist’s aim to be good. In liberal communist eth-
ics, Žižek states, the ruthless pursuit of profit is counter-
acted by charity:  
 
Charity is the humanitarian mask hiding the face of economic exploitation. In a su-
perego blackmail of gigantic proportions, the developed countries “help” the unde-
veloped with aid, credits, and so on, and thereby avoid the key issue, namely their 
complicity in and co-responsibility for the miserable situation of the undeveloped 
(!i"ek 2009: 19). 
 
For a further understanding, this point is very essential. We 
learn that cynicism does not only mean the most blatant direct 
violence, crime and murder. Furthermore, it does not only 
point to a certain, small group of «selfish» people (the group 
of the «1%») whose behavior could be somehow called «greedy» 
or «unjust». The form of cynicism that the counter-cynic so-
cial-critic tries to name and shame, surrounds us in our daily 
life. The better we function within a cynic system, the happi-
er we are, the more we are cynics ourselves. To put it simple 
and plain: ‘There is no just life within the unjust, there is 
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no right life within the wrong one.’ 57  Every coffee-to-go, 
along with its unsorted paper-plastic waste is a cynic action. 
Every Google search, every smartphone call is a cynic action 
on the cost of others, every 10-Kroner pølse or 13-Kroner 
burger is a cynic action on the costs of others; let it be the 
environmental damage costs and work exploitation that remain 
invisible within the «happy islands of prosperity». Charity, 
thus, comes into the picture as the tip of the iceberg of a 
felt misperception. «We», the subjects of enlightened false 
consciousness, tend not only to be political animals filled by 
Isaiah Berlin’s negative and positive freedom, democracy, suc-
cess, and happiness. «We» do also tend to be social animals 
full of care and empathy. While being blind for the structural 
coherences that lead billions of people starve, we are not 
blind towards the portrayed poverty on glossy magazine titles: 
Big brown eyes meet slogans such as «adopt a poor child in Af-
rica». And the angels of humanity start to feel sad. Žižek 
would answer with an «and so on...» and add an academic’s in-
terpretation of The evil in you is the evil in me: “The exem-
plary figures of evil today [...] are those who, while fully 
engaged in creating conditions for such universal devastation 
and pollution, buy their way out of their own activity, living 
in gated communities, eating organic food, taking holidays in 
wildlife preserves [...]”58 (Žižek 2009: 23). 
If someone tries to grasp the contemporary system around 
«us»; searching for a meta-variable that would manage to de-
scribe the red line connecting every single individual of the 
world’s population with each other -- and with its different 
levels of community, this someone could end up with an idea 
such as Antonio Gramsci’s «cultural hegemony». Many issues on 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 This modified statement of the author makes reference to Theodor W. Adorno’s saying “Es lässt sich privat nicht 
mehr richtig leben”; in a later version published as “Kein richtiges Leben im falschen”/“Life does not live” in his 
Minima Moralia: Reflections From Damaged Life (1951). 
58 The narrative of «the evil in you is the evil in me» allows us to read !i"ek 2009 with the bitter-sweet enrichment of 
bin Laden 2002: “Let us not forget one of your major characteristics: your duality in both manners and values; your 
hypocrisy in manners and principles. All manners, principles and values have two scales: one for you and one for 
the others.” Available online:  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver [Nov 11, 2013]. 
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greed and grievance are linked to each other. Overconsumption 
and poverty, overproduction and hunger, exploration and ex-
ploitation happen side by side. The disillusion of the mother 
that lost her child due to malnutrition is somehow connected 
to the disillusion of the wealthy, oversupplied peace student 
who reads about her story in expensive, well-sophisticated 
books that use terms such as destiny. Each of these two dis-
tinct forms of disillusion takes not place although the other 
part of the extreme occurs at the same time. It takes place 
because of the existence of the other extreme at the same 
time. To put it simple, nowadays cultural-hegemonic super-
structure is capitalism. In its contemporary form, it comes 
along with the sheer acceptance of neoliberal inherent neces-
sities.  
Scene change: Watching a film59 on a couple from Manila in 
their mid-20s that struggles with gaining enough income to 
barely survive can enlighten this thought roughly. All the 12 
students who watch the film, sit in a warm, cosy cinema that 
is owned by the university they study at. The size of the 
course and the equipment (professional cinema seats, big 
screen, multi-media high tech) suggests that «money» does not 
play a major role. The state uses «his» money to invest in 
«education». Large parts of this money come indirectly  from 
successful oil explorations worldwide, for example in Angola 
and Libya 60 . The students study subjects full of moral power: 
human rights, peace, and visual culture. They are the sons and 
daughters of wealthy middle-class families. Their childhood 
was secure. The income of their parents enabled them to focus 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 This section deals with the Australian feature length documentary Celso and Cora, watched on October 25, 2013, as 
part of the film seminar SVF-3105, Film in cross-cultural research, at the University of Tromsø. 
60 Statoil ASA holds major oil and gas exploration concessions in Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Libya, Nigeria, 
Mozambique, Surinam, and Tanzania. See http://www.statoil.com/no/ouroperations/explorationprod/internationalfields/ 
pages/default.aspx [Nov 11, 2013]. In 2011, Statoil received extensive drill rights on Iraqi oil fields. The former MI6 
chief John Scarlett was then appointed as special advisor for Statoil’s Iraq activities: Scarlett, who “drew up the 
document which claimed Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction that could be deployed within 45 
minutes, has been taken on by Norwegian firm Statoil” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1389867/Spy-chief-
dodgy-dossier-gets-Iraq-oil-job.html [Nov 11, 2013]. In November 2013, Statoil’s activities in Iran as well as in Iraq cease. 
Meanwhile, the oil company advertises: “In 2013, Statoil found more oil and gas than any other company world-
wide” http://www.statoil.com/no/OurOperations/ExplorationProd/Pages/Funn2013.aspx [Nov 11, 2013]. As of 2013, the 
Government of Norway is its largest shareholder with 66,6% of the shares. 
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on fine arts. What the audience, what these 12 people are con-
fronted with is the following: Celso and Cora, two portrayed 
adults in the same age, struggle with earning enough money for 
themselves and their two children to survive as a functioning 
family. More precisely, they hardly manage to pay medical 
treatment for one of the children. Celso works as a fulltime 
cigarette seller, selling Western brands such as Marlboro, 
thus enabling Manila’s wealthy sons and daughters a cigarette 
break from «clubbing» in a trendy disco. The whole plot is 
presented to the audience through the lens of a white, -- and 
again -- wealthy middle-class filmmaker. Celso and Cora are 
clearly portrayed as the under-dogs of a structure that ena-
bles others to enjoy a life of overconsumption. After the 
screening, the students perform their academic duty, their 
«workload»: they try to give significance to the filmmaker’s 
meaning; they try to read the code of the filmic work. One of 
the students raises the question: ‘Why did the filmmaker not 
intervene; why did he not help to buy the medicine?’  
That question has the potential to let us unveil a specif-
ic form of subtle every-day cynicism: The situation of Cora 
and Celso is understood and framed as a single case, not as a 
structural problem that the 12 students are part of. The ask-
ing spectator simply chooses not to see the structural vio-
lence that emanates from a seemingly stable system of global 
social inequality: The same system that guarantees the specta-
tors a «free» cosy cinema seat at their education institution; 
the very system that also helps to fulfil materialistic dreams 
and academic goals. This perspective we call «non-ideology». 
We tend not to see the link. And we tend to call the few ones 
that do highlight this very link «ideologists». For the real-
ist non-ideologist, the «portrayed system» provides enough 
self-healing forces. For the do-good non-ideologists, overcom-
ing the portrayed situation would mean to «help through chari-
ty». It would result in the aim to change the lifestyle of the 
portrayed ones. It would not necessarily have to result in a 
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change of our very own lifestyles. This shortly presented sce-
ne change would have made Antonio Gramsci’s day: It is, after 
all, the portrayed «ideologist» alone who would refuse both, 
(i) accepting the cultural hegemony of global neoliberal 
thought and (ii) trying to overcome the system’s injustices 
with treating merely the symptoms than accusing the causes. 
 
We live in a society where a kind of Hegelian speculative identity of opposites ex-
ists. Certain features, attitudes, and norms of life are no longer perceived as ideo-
logically marked. They appear to be neutral, non-ideological, natural, commonsen-
sical. We designate as ideology that which stands out from this background: ex-
treme religious zeal or dedication to a particular political orientation. The Hegelian 
point here would be that it is precisely the neutralisation of some features into a 
spontaneously accepted background that marks out ideology at its purest and at its 
most effective. This is the dialectical “coincidence of opposites”: the actualisation 
of a notion or an ideology at its purest coincides with, or, more precisely, appears as 
its opposite, as non-ideology. Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for violence. Social-
symbolic violence at its purest appears as its opposite, as the spontaneity of the mi-
lieu in which we dwell, of the air we breathe (!i"ek 2009: 31). 
 
The presented dilemma is insomuch tricky, as one cannot blame 
the 12 students for being egoistic agents built up barely by 
apathy and ignorance. But how is it possible that the struggle 
of the majority of the world’s population61 and especially the 
malnutrition, the starvation and the constant hunger of almost 
one billion people is not being consequently connected towards 
the overconsumption of others? The problem we have to deal 
with is not the individualised malnourished baby with the big 
brown eyes on the glossy TIME cover. Or Cora. Or Celso. These 
are only the individualized and emotionally charged symptoms 
of a cynic superstructure of a hyper-ideological «non-
ideology».  
In the most general sense: Why do we accept and support 
man-made inequalities that we find imposed to ourselves 
through neither fault nor initiative of our own? The 12 stu-
dents might confront themselves with two basic questions: (i) 
Does anyone of them think that s/he works more than the por-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Here, the holistic term (world) population should indeed focus on all creatures and organisms, not only on human 
beings or certain other species. 
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trayed characters? This question might be easily answered. 
Both, the «non-ideological» realist agents and the «non-
ideological» do-good agents would reply: ‘No.’ An examination 
on the first question would somehow force the audience to re-
think the above mentioned ideological setting of «non-
ideology»: where a person’s (self)-esteem builds upon monetary 
variables; where social inequalities are seen as a howsoever 
accepted performance measurement and a driving incentive sys-
tem; while equalizing idea(l)s are regarded as the core of uto-
pian ideological naïveté. This leads to question two. 
(ii) Does the fact that Cora and Celso «work more» than 
the spectators (according to the non-ideologist performance-
based notion) mean that Cora and Celso receive more «credit»  
than the spectators (according to the non-ideologist monetary-
based notion)? No. It does not. Here, we notice the classic 
dilemma of capitalist «non-ideology». Financial inequality is 
justified by different workloads and its time exposure. Work 
is money. Time is money. Money is the key to wealth. But there 
lies the rub: To secure their living, Cora and Celso have to 
invest much more physical workload than any of the 12 stu-
dents. It simply works the other way around. Even if we tend 
to perceive the non-ideologically framed, «connected» face-
book-TEDtalk-broadcast world around us as «smart»; Cora and 
Celso will never have the capability to take a camera, book a 
flight and film 12 visual cultural students watching a visual 
cultural film addressing social inequality. Unless someone 
would find this meta-film idea «dynamic, refreshing and crea-
tive». Then, of course, a singular scholarship could work as 
singular do-good charity by a noble spender: ‘Why did the no-
ble spender not intervene?’ 
When we look into the mirror, we are confronted with «I», 
the every-day cynic; a master of schizophrenia. We somehow 
manage to avoid cognitive dissonance caused by conflicting 
values, cognitions, beliefs, and emotions within ourselves. 
The psychoanalytic term compartmentalization tries to grasp 
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this phenomenon: “Compartmentalization allows (...) conflict-
ing ideas to co-exist by inhibiting direct or explicit 
acknowledgement and interaction between separate compart-
mentalized self states” (Leary/Tangney 2005: 58-59). While be-
ing part of a cynic superstructure, the classic contemporary 
cynic neglects to be a cynic her/himself and outsources the 
blame to an easily portrayed cabinet of cynics: Kony is a cyn-
ic, Assad is a cynic, Bush is a cynic. And while surrounded by 
and engaging in daily cynic actions, the cynic tends to shift 
occurring cynic actions as far as possible from her/himself -- 
and as catchy as possible: Free Gaza, Free Syria! For him/her, 
the visible conflict; the most blatant cynicism happens there, 
not here.  
On the one hand, the author of these lines refuses to use 
a smartphone because of the aim to minimize his very role in a 
global ruthless «rare earths business». On the other hand he 
uses a laptop from a company that is known to play a major 
role within this exact business. On the one hand, the author 
of these lines rejects to consume coffee-to-go coffee due to 
the enormous plastic consumption and disposable waste. On the 
other hand he consumes litres of coffee each week and supports 
the whole industry that guarantees a caffeine overconsumption 
even in the Arctic. On the one hand, the author of these lines 
decides to print the thesis on hand on recycled paper. On the 
other hand he printed out dozens of papers just for the prepa-
ration of this thesis. As mentioned earlier: No matter which 
topic we investigate in: we, the overcivilized subjects -- to 
be understood as a cohort of Althusser’s overdetermined sub-
ject62 -- are doomed to be cynic once we manage to live a con-
venient life within any cynic system. The more convenient our 
life, the more cynic we get. We do know very well about the 
schizophrenic character of the accumulation of capital. Yet, 
we defend capitalism as the «best functioning» societal system 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 The interjection «Althusser’s overdetermined subject» refers to Louis Althusser’s Contradiction and Overdetermina-
tion (1962). On the term: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive-/althusser/1962/overdetermination.htm [Nov 15, 2013]. 
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because of the annexed «greedy nature» of mankind. This, to 
put it simply, is the core statement of Sloterdijk‘s enlight-
ened false consciousness. 
The question remains: Do we notice the described contempo-
rary cynicism? How do we frame cynicism? Is it the sheer 
metier of the «other», the «(d)evil»? The less we perceive 
ourselves being connected to a cynic mode, the happier we are. 
Those who pick the fruits of a globalised cultural hegemony of 
a neoliberal superstructure do not have to work as much as the 
billions of people who indirectly guarantee this wealthy life-
style full of materialistic joy and leisure. The notion of the 
(capitalist) system we tend to speak about is not naturally 
given. It is man-made. Jean Ziegler, the former United Na-
tions’ Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, is not cynic 
while announcing the cynic fact that every “child who dies 
from hunger is a murdered child” (Ziegler 2011: 12) 63 . He is 
not cynic while announcing that our world society -- the sum 
of all «I» -- actively murders billions of animals, including 
millions of humans by its overconsumption. He neither is a 
«crazy leftist» nor a «conspiracy theorist», but someone that 
sticks to one of the most relevant occurrences of our time. As 
long as the immense suffering takes place more or less silent 
and somehow invisible, the system seems to function logically. 
The borders of countries do not divide between rich and 
poor. It is an illusion to talk about the «poor» Third World 
countries and to describe all of its citizens as needy. The 
financial elites act globally. Excessive ownership and accumu-
lation of money takes place within the poorest countries -- 
unveiling the gap of the global goods’ distribution in its 
most radical notion. But one does not even have to glimpse at 
the uncountable Mercedes S-class cars driving through Manila. 
A look into one of the many supermarket dumpsters in the Arc-
tic city of Tromsø works the same: On a daily basis, we find 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 Translated by the author. French original reads: “Un enfant qui meurt de faim est un enfant assassiné”, in Destruc-
tion massive: Géopolitique de la faim, 2011. 
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roses from Ghana, avocados from Chile; and bananas from the 
Philippines -- products of the big businessmen and large scale 
manufacturers in Accra, Santiago, and Manila. Meanwhile, the 
rebellious «anti-capitalist» «anti-cynic» smokes a joint and 
supports the financial elites of the influential drug markets 
in Colombia and Afghanistan, wearing a Che Guevara shirt that 
was produced in Bangladesh. 
It is very easy to blame «singular events» such as the 
Holocaust as a cynic superstructure; driven by Hannah Arendt’s 
concept of the banality of evil. It is less easy to blame now-
adays’ unjust distribution of goods -- including even the 
cheerful visit at Burger King or Starbucks -- as another ba-
nality of evil that inevitably results in death of animals 
[directly], nature [directly], and human fellows [indirectly]; 
as a cynic superstructure as well. Although we live in times 
of «infotainment», we do not seem to draw the link between our 
very own lifestyle and the hidden consequences of it. As said 
above, the price of a hamburger wrapped into plastic-paper is 
not the price the direct consumer has to pay. It is not «10 
Kroner». This tasty snack in-between contains a lot more envi-
ronmental damage costs. Costs, that neither the consumer nor 
the company have to pay. But who pays then?     
If today’s biggest forms of violence are not longer marked 
within the visible, it needs courage to speak them out loudly. 
What must be focused on here is Foucault’s Courage of Truth; 
the shamelessness of the maverick. While raising the question 
‘But who pays then?’ we aim at the same time for the answer of 
the following framing question: Who asks ‘but who pays then’? 
 In an analysis on the so called critico-political function 
of literature, Jacques Derrida notes that the “freedom to say 
everything is a very powerful political weapon, but one which 
might immediately let itself be neutralized as a fiction” 
(Derrida 1992: 39-40). According to Derrida, this revolution-
ary power could become “very conservative: The writer can just 
as well be held to be irresponsible” (ibidem). 
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In other words: What does it mean to read the blatant 
criticism of Sinclair Lewis or of Knut Hamsun if, at the same 
time, one has to admit that Hamsun’s novels were powerful 
weapons but at the same time neutralized by a readership that 
shrugged them off as pure fiction: “Hamsuns romaner var kraft-
fulle politiske våpen”, forceful weapons, “men det lesene 
borgerskap nøytraliserte romanene som fiksjoner og stilte ikke 
Hamsun til ansvar” (Dingstad 2003: 296). Thinking about Knut 
Hamsun; about Kierkegaard and Nietzsche -- and many more bit-
ing critics of that kind leads us to think on the earlier men-
tioned figure of Sinclair. It leads us to think about what the 
scholastic philosopher would call a neo-Kynic64. Ståle Dingstad 
writes: 
  
Det ironiske i Hamsuns romaner, den uendelige absolutte negativitet, kan man 
dermed forstå som en intellektuell kynisme. (...) Til gjengjeld tar han til orde mot en 
hel rekke fenomener i tiden, for eksempel de August representerer: kapitalismen, 
industrialismen, amerikanismen (Dingstad 2003: 241).  
 
That leads us to ask: Who utilizes the power of such a dark, 
but enlightening intellectual Kynicism in our contemporary 
times? Until here, the analysis was based on a stream of con-
sciousness and, as a result, an overdetermination of both, the 
writer and the reader. This was insofar helpful as this mode 
lively reflects the language of Kabarett. Now we change the 
sites: From a practical-driven (occasionally Kynic) observa-
tion of the cynicism around us to a theory-oriented explora-













2.2  Counter-cynicism with /K/: An academic approach? 
===================================================== 
 
Coincidentally, the author of these lines came across the pic-
ture to the right (image 7), which strongly reminds him on the 
image structure of the 130 years older well-known painting of 
Diogenes the Kynic by John William Waterhouse to the left (im-
age 6). This painting, nevertheless, portrays a situation that 
could have happened in such a way 2330 years ago. If we, con-
clusively, want to adapt the Ancient thought in the «here and 
now»; -- or, more precisely: if we want to think in terms such 
as Kynic peace activism, a final focus on counter-cynic activ-
ism within academia could be helpful. As mentioned earlier, 
the following chapter will focus on the popular rediscovery of 
Ancient Kynicism within Political Philosophy in the 1980s. To 
do so, a theory net will be spun. This theory net will deal 




Image 6| J. W. Waterhouse, 1882:  Image 7| L. Jackson, 2012: «New York».65 
«Diogenes».66 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Comment by the photographer Lucas Jackson: «Fashionistas pose for photographs in front of a homeless man out-
side Moynihan Station following a showing of the Rag & Bone Spring/Summer 2013 collection during New York 
Fashion Week». September 7, 2012». Interesting phenomenon throughout the thesis outline: Why does the por-
trayal take place in a framing of the ‘good, ascetic’ masculine versus ‘bad, greedy’ feminine? 
66 Other important works: Jean-Léon Gérôme's [1824-1902] «Diogenes» (1860) shows a lonseome Diogenes with tube, 
dogs, and lattern; Jules Bastien-Lepage's [1848-1884] «Diogène» (1873) shows a lonesome Diogenes with lattern. Jo-
hann H. W. Tischbein's [1751-1828] «Diogenes sucht einen Menschen» (1870) and Jacob van Campen's [1595-1657] «Diog-
enes in the market of Athens» (1628) show a Diogenes with lattern, surrounded by the masses. 
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«Theory net»: What is meant with that term? Instead of fo-
cusing on one model or one theory alone, the following outline 
will work with different modern interpretations of the Kynic 
‘school’1. To use the Kynic movement and its main motives as 
such would definitely go beyond the scope of the following an-
alytical discussion. At the same time, with respect to the 
specific empirical focus on contemporary (counter-)cynicism, 
it indeed makes more sense to focus on (rather) contemporary 
interpretations of Kynicism than to focus on a traditional, 
historical elaboration of writings and documents from the time 
of the Kynics themselves.  
Thus, the theory net aims to present three (rather) con-
temporary philosophers that challenge nowadays’ societal cyni-
cism with the tools of the Ancient Kynics. As already men-
tioned, Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason (1983), Fou-
cault’s Courage of Truth (1984) and Žižek’s Sublime Object of 
Ideology (1989) give the reader the possibility to investigate 
into the popular rediscovery of Kynic thoughts within the aca-
demic spheres of philosophy within the 1980s. And this is how 
the theory net will be build up: From each of these three 
works on counter-cynicism, one main notion is drawn into the 
theory net. While Sloterdijk mainly focuses on the two-fold 
character of K/cynicism -- in its cynic and counter-cynic form 
--, Foucault presents the truthful speech, parrhesia, as re-
bellious and cheeky tool of the counter-cynic social-critic. 
Doing so, he disqualifies the inner-systemic «truth» as an in-
strument of falsehood and highlights the Kynic counter-truth 
as the real metier of honesty. Finally, Žižek calls for a rea-
lignment of Marx’ famous statement: “They do not know it but 
they do it” (Marx 1992: 125) into his (and in this case: also 
its inherent) Kynic inversion: “They do know very well, but 
still they are doing it” (Žižek 1989: 43). It is primarily 
this threefold notion of Kynic inversion that will be present-
ed in the following analysis. Thus, the Kynic theory net can 
be spun. After investigating the threefold effects of violence 
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and the twofold notion of cynicism, the primary aim of the 
following chapter will be to finally ask: How can the por-
trayed «rediscoveries» of Kynicism be thought together in a 
theory net? 
Thereby, the underlying hypothesis is the following: All 
three authors use a somehow distinct version of «inversion». 
While Slavoj Žižek formulates his principle as an inversion 
himself; namely as the “inversion [of Marx]” (Žižek 2009: 
25[28]); the other two philosophers use the term not by them-
selves. Nevertheless, a short portrayal of the main statements 
of Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason and Foucault’s 
Courage of Truth will reveal that it is Sloterdijk’s aim to 
present the Ancient Kynicism as such as the inversion of the 
contemporary cynicism; and that it is Foucault’s aim to por-
tray biting cheekiness and «truthful» social-criticism as in-
version of what is sold as common truth. The following chapter 
will examine the three approaches and will translate them into 
the following inversions: 
 
iii. Sloterdijk’s rediscovery of Kynicism: the inversion of cynicism; 
iii. Foucault’s rediscovery of Kynicism: the inversion of truth;  
iii. !i"ek’s rediscovery of Kynicism: the inversion of Marx. 
 
All three theoretical cornerstones from Sloterdijk, Foucault, 
and Žižek have their roots within the philosophical Kynicism, 
but transfer the Ancient concept into the contemporary time. 
Compared to chapter 1 and 2, the modus operandi of chapter 3 
will be rather descriptively, whereby the three models (and 
their translation into the language of inversion) will be pre-
sented one after another (ONE t[w]o THREE). All presentations 
will relay to each other while building up on the previous em-


















































Conclusive Considerations: Kynic Reflections on the  




«Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized.  
In the first it is ridiculed, in the second it is opposed, in the third it is regarded as self-evident.» 
–– Arthur Schopenhauer, 1993 [1844].67 
 
«[Every] new doctrine [...] goes through three stages.  
First, people say it is not true; then, that it is against religion; and in the third stage, that it was long known.»   
–– Karl Ernst von Baer, 1866. 
 
«Every great scientific truth goes through three stages.  
First, people say it conflicts with the Bible. Next they say it had been discovered before. Lastly they say they 
always believed it.» 
–– Alan Mackay, 1992. 
 
The following section will undertake an above-board academic 
approach. It will lead us from elementary empirical explora-
tions to three theoretical thoughts. 
 
============================================================ 
3.1 Peter Sloterdijk: Kynicism and the inversion of cynicism 
============================================================ 
 
What does it mean to speak about a cynic person? This question 
could be formulated as the most essential discussion point 
within Peter Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason (1987 
[German original: 1983]). In this (being his main) work, the 
German philosopher focuses on the “laughing tradition of sa-
tirical knowledge” (xviii) and describes cynicism as the en-
lightened false consciousness (5), as mentioned above. In op-
position to cynicism with /c/, he develops the idea of a Kyni-
cism with /K/: Against the fatal power of the cynic figure 
(the military cynic, the political animal, the careerist among 
other), the Kynic pits an “anarchic counter-power” (14). 
Sloterdijk links himself above all with what he calls the 
“neo-Kynical” approach of Nietzsche and Heidegger68; and calls 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 Cit. The Harper Book of Citations, page 451 (Fitzhenry 1993). Wrong attribution. See Shallit 2005. 
68 The term «neo-Kynic» refers to Heinrich Niehues-Pröbsting’s (1988: 213-216) Neo-Cyniker. 
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for the re-discovery of a lost cheekiness and biting social 
criticism in the treatment of violent and disfiguring 
/c/ynical maxims (241). His work aims to find the Kynic’s 
“lost cheekiness” (116) within our times. Throughout the com-
prehensive book, Sloterdijk illustrates his statements with a 
vast number of images. Not without reason, a portrayal of Nie-
tzsche is the first one (xxviii). Whereas the German original 
edition covers 960 pages in two volumes, the official English 
Minneapolis translation from 1987 has 559 pages. Talking about 
Sloterdijk’s work itself -- and not only about its content -- 
makes insofar sense as the Critique can be read as neo-Kynic 




     6. Concerning the Psychosomatics of the Zeitgeist 139  
  Tongue, Stuck Out    141 
  Mouth, Smiling Maliciously, Crooked  142  
  Mouth, Bitter, Tight    143 
  Mouth, Laughing Loudly, Big-Mouthed 143 
  Mouth, Serene, Still    145 
  Eye Gazes, Eye Blinkers   145 
  Breasts      147 
  Arses       147 
  Fart       150  
  Shit, Refuse     151 
  Genitals      152 
   
 
     8. The Cardinal Cynicisms    217  
  Military Cynicism    219 
  
 
Table 2| Content list [excerpted by the author] of Critique of Cynical Reason (Sloterdijk 1987). 
 
Indeed, Peter Sloterdijk describes «the arts» as a form of 
bourgeois neo-Kynicism (391). Taking the excerpt from the con-
tent list shown above (table 2) into consideration, one might 
understand what the author means with counter-cynic (but 
Kynic), counter-academic (but educated), neo-Kynic cheekiness. 
Most elementary for Sloterdijk’s work is his Kynic definition 
of cynicism: 
  
Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness. It is that modernized, unhappy conscious-
ness, on which enlightenment has laboured both successfully and in vain. It has 
learned its lessons in enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was not able to, 
put them into practice. Well-off and miserable at the same time, this consciousness 
no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already reflexive-
ly buffered (Sloterdijk 1987 [1983]: 5). 
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One specific form that directly links to the field of 
peace studies; and that takes a prominent role within 
Sloterdijk’s concept of contemporary cynicism, is the distinc-
tively formulated military cynicism (see again table 2). Here, 
he differentiates between three types: “Military cynicism can 
emerge when three male martial character types have assumed 
clear contours in a society: the hero, the hesitater, and the 
coward” (220). Interestingly enough, the number three does al-
so in the work of Sloterdijk play a dominant role. Towards 
these three military characters he later formulates three mil-
itary tactics. For the formulation of a contemporary (paci-
fist) counter-military activism this would mean to formulate a 
three-fold notion of Kynic peace activism; always with the in-
tent to ask: What would Diogenes have done today? 
And here comes the point where we can reflect on 
Sloterdijk’s notion of Kynicism with /K/. According to him, 
Kynic behaviour can only function through cheekiness and 
adapted sarcasm: “There can be no healthy relation of modern-
day enlightenment to its own history without sarcasm” (7). In 
the moment in which the counter-enlightened agent, the intend-
ed self-reflective «I» -- which still has a notion of ‘virtue’ 
-- does stop to take man-made variables such as the state, 
commercialism, militarism, religion [and so on] (too) serious, 
s/he/it enters the sphere of “light-hearted disrespect in the 
continuation of the original tasks” (7)69. The task to read the 
language and behaviour of Ancient Kynicism could not be formu-
lated more simple and plain than that: “As things stand, the 
only loyalty to enlightenment -- which means: a ‘real’ form of 
enlightenment; the inversion of /E/nlightenment; a counter-
/E/nlightenment -- consists in disloyalty” (Sloterdijk 1987: 
7). Here, Kynicism means the inversion of enlightened false 
consciousness. It means the inversion of cynicism. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 As alternative towards siding with the «light-hearted disrespect», Sloterdijk formulates a «pessimism that remains 




3.2 Michel Foucault: Parrhesia and the inversion of truth 
========================================================= 
 
In his last lecture series 70 , Michel Foucault focuses for the 
first time on “Ancient Cynicism” 71 . He describes parrhesia as 
the major characteristic of the Cynic and highlights the motto 
of Diogenes: “Change the value of the currency” (Foucault 
2012: 241). Thereby, the whole background of his last pub-
lished lecture might be cynically interpretable: Instead of 
actively participating and critically challenging Foucault, 
the preface informs the reader that many students preferred to 
just use their radio recorders to record the lecture series 
and remain in silence. Foucault noted: 
  
It should be possible to discuss what I have put forward. Sometimes, when it has 
not been a good lecture, it would need very little, just one question, to put every-
thing straight. However, this question never comes. The group effect in France 
makes any genuine discussion impossible. And as there is no feedback, the course is 
theatricalized. My relationship with the people there is like that of an actor or an ac-
robat. And when I have finished speaking, a sensation of total solitude... (Foucault 
2012 [1984]: xii).  
 
On the other hand, the obsession of ‘silently recording’ their 
idol helps us to follow Foucault’s lessons (including his 
well-archived statements on short-handed improvisations) 30 
years after. And, what might be even more valuable, this short 
anecdote might directly reflect Michel Foucault’s aim to speak 
out the truth. Here, the philosopher presents what he defines 
the basic instrument of Kynicism: to speak out. To mock. To 
unveil. 
 Why -- he might have ask himself -- did none of my listen-
ers intervene although I presented what a Kynic would have 
called «bullshit»? For the Master’s thesis, Foucault’s Courage 
of Truth must be considered a happy finding: Shortly before 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 Joseph J. Tanke, for example writes that “Foucault opened what would be his last series of public lectures [...]. The 
guiding theme is the study of ethical parrhesia in the Greek world. This series of lectures is full of many aperçus 
that remain undeveloped. One such insight [...] [is to look] at the modern artist as a contemporary Cynic [sic; here to 
be understood as: Kynic]” (2002: 170).  
71 Foucault does indeed speak about Ancient «Cynicism». Nevertheless, from here on, also the paragraph Two, The 
Inversion of Truth, on Foucault’s interpretation will use the phrase «Kynicism» for consistency reasons.  
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the well-known philosopher died, he changed the original out-
line of his parrhesia lecture that should have presented free 
speech in general and chose to purely focus on its Kynic form 
from lecture 9 (February 29, 1984) on until the end (March 28, 
1984) 72 . “I would like -- without knowing yet how far I will 
take it, if it will last until the end of the year, or if I 
will stop -- to take the example of [K]ynicism” (Foucault 
2012: 164): With these honest and kind words, Foucault opened 
his remarks on Kynicism. And «it» did last; he did not stop. 
Moreover, within the following two introducing sentences he 
already formulated the outline of hundreds of sentences that 
would follow on the same issue: 
 
i.  It seems to me that in [K]ynicism, in [K]ynic practice, the requirement of an extremely 
distinctive form of life – with very characteristic, well defined rules, conditions, or 
modes – is strongly connected to the principle of truth-telling, of truth-telling without 
shame or fear, of unrestricted and courageous truth-telling, of truth-telling which push-
es its courage and boldness to the point that it becomes intolerable insolence (Foucault 
2012 [1984]: 165).  
 
ii. This connecting up of truth-telling and mode of life, this fundamental, essential con-
nection in [K]ynicism between living in a certain way and dedicating oneself to telling 
the truth is all the more noteworthy for taking place immediately as it were, without 
doctrinal mediation, or at any rate within a fairly rudimentary theoretical framework 
(Foucault 2012 [1984]: 165). 
 
This could already bring us close to the field of Kabarett: 
Who speaks out what Foucault would call the ‘truth-telling 
without shame or fear’, who does risk and provoke ‘intolerable 
insolence’? Could the initial mentioned statement of Hagen Re-
ther not be perceived as the ideal example of a truth-teller? 
Other than the audience of Foucault in Paris, he shouts it out 
loudly: the «lost cheekiness» against the cynicism of our 
times. Whoever «risks» something for telling the truth that 
might hurt the mass -- and let the only costs be not to be 
liked by a wider public; or to be called a ‘cynic’ -- would, 
according to Foucault’s understanding, step into the footsteps 
of Diogenes: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Please find Michel Foucault’s course content list under the following link: http://pages.uoregon.edu/koopman/events_rea 
dings/cgc/foucault_CdF_84_CT_complete.pdf [Jan 31, 2014]. 
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In Diogenes Laertius, for example, among the many other anecdotes attributed to 
Diogenes [...], there is this one. One day he was asked what is most beautiful in men 
(to kalliston en tois anthropois). The answer: parrhesia, free-spokenness» (Foucault 2012 
[1984]: 166). 
 
To «change the value of the currency» does for Foucault mean 
to change the understanding of what is meant by truth. He de-
scribes the Kynic figure as “the man of parrhesia, the man of 
truth-telling” (Foucault 2012: 166). This we can read as Fou-
cault’s momentum of inversion. Here, Kynicism means the inver-
sion of truth. 
 
===================================================== 
3.3 Slavoj Žižek: Knowledge and the inversion of Marx 
===================================================== 
 
If any of the three roughly presented philosophers could be 
described as the reincarnation of an Ancient Kynic, it might 
be him: Slavoj Žižek. He is widely visible: on the film 
screens, in social science compendia, in the Internet. He ful-
fills the notion of a loud mocker. His language is the lan-
guage of provocation. His beard is sloppy, his appearance 
messy, and his ‘academic’ style is counter-academic: Instead 
of lecturing in lecture halls, he prefers to lecture on the 
street, or on the rubbish dump (Taylor 2008; see images 8-9).  
 
           
Images 8-9| Slavoj !i"ek in Examined Life (Taylor 2008: vid. 0:23:32; 0:22:21). 
 
It should not surprise that the Slovenian thinker focused on 
Kynicism in the beginning of his public breakthrough. And may-
be it was especially the topic of Kynicism that conferred and 
offered his counter-approaches the suitable frame; a «channel 
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of communication» that would go beyond the classical scope of 
positivist sense making. 
In other words: Slavoj Žižek is not thinkable without an 
inherent Kynic attitude. He uses the attributes that were 
highlighted in section ONE and TWO as a label for a kind of in-
your-face social-criticism. As soon as the camera points to 
the waste and rubbish shown in image 8, Žižek announces out of 
the background: “This is where we should start feeling at 
home” (Žižek, cit. Taylor 2008: 22:21). He then continues to 
make his philosophical point with the most blatant Kynic ele-
ment that we firstly encountered through Sloterdijk’s content 
list on page six: shit; or, to turn it cynical: the refusal of 
it: 
 
Part of our daily perception on reality is that this [showing at the waste] disappears 
from our world. When you go to the toilet... shit... disappears (...). Of course, ra-
tionally you know it, it’s there, in canalization and so on; but at a certain level of your 
most elementary experience, it disappears from your world. But the problem is: 
waste does not disappear (!i"ek, cit. Taylor 2008: 0:22:58).  
 
With this seemingly easy language, Žižek uses the power of 
provocative cheekiness, of counter-cynic (Sloterdijk) truth-
telling (Foucault), to enter a very complex topic: our very 
own partnership with the contemporary cynic, the over-
consumer. He speaks in images while at the same time directly 
pointing out the core problem of the ‘enlightened’ ‘post-
ideological’ Western society. What does the shit stand for? 
It, literally, means the combined shit of every single indi-
vidual in its most elementary form. But it does of course con-
sist of more meaning at the same time: Drawing on Sloterdijk 
who inspired him to note that “cynical reason is no longer na-
ïve, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness” 
(Žižek 1989: 28), he formulates an inversion of Marx’ famous 
Capital statement73: “one knows the falsehood very well, one is 
well aware of a particular interest hidden behind an ideologi-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 “The most elementary definition of ideology”, says !i"ek (1989: 28), “is probably the well-known phrase from 
Marx’s Capital: ‘They do not know it, but they do it’”, [“by reducing the material thing to the abstraction, value”] 
(supplementation in square brackets added by the author; taken from Marx 1992: 125).  
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cal universality, but still one does not renounce it” (Žižek 
1989: 29). This can stand as the essence of his ideology-
criticism within The Sublime Object of Ideology in which he 
further asks: “Does this concept of ideology as a naïve con-
sciousness still apply to today’s world?” (ibid.). Diogenes 
would have answered: Yes! In other words: We do wrong, and we 
know it, but we refuse to refuse. Here, Kynicism means the in-































































Thinking in terms of Kynic peace activism? 




«Every joke is a tiny revolution. […] 
Whatever destroys dignity and brings down the mighty from their seats, preferably with a bump, is funny!»  
–– George Orwell, 1945. 
 
«[...] everybody shouts for transparency and information.  
But we don’t do anything with it. We know everything, but still don’t know what our knowledge 
is good for. Otherwise, we would have to change our lives; –– information for its own sake!» 
–– Hagen Rether, 2011. 
 
«[...] if everything is ideology, everyone is lying.  
No one believes in ideology, yet they act as if they do while knowing full well they don’t.» 
–– Menachem Feuer, 2013. 
 
This thesis aimed to be a voyage of exploration. After passing 
through practical, palpable passages that were characterized 
by the Kabarett-esk narrative mode stream of consciousness, 
the last chapter was used to translate Kynic thoughts into a 
workable peace research language on which further investiga-
tions can build up. I aimed to present a theoretical threefold 
approach that I called a (loosely interwoven) theory net. 
While focusing on three distinct works on Kynicism -- each of 
them understood as counter-cynicism -- the question was 
raised: How can the portrayed «rediscoveries» of Kynicism be 
thought together? I chose to find a common language -- or bet-
ter: a common access -- towards the three different contempo-
rary readings on Kynicism. I then chose to adapt a notion that 
initially was used by Slavoj Žižek to describe his understand-
ing of Kynic thought: the language of inversion. Whereas Žižek 
made it clear towards his readership that the Kynic slogan 
«everyone knows very well, but...» should be understood as an 
Kynic inversion of Marx[ism], such notion of inversion was al-
so seen to be helpful for an encounter of Sloterdijk’s and 
Foucault’s remarks on the Kynic behaviour and Kynic parrhesia. 
Therefore, every of the three sections ended with the same 
phrase: ‘Here, Kynicism means the inversion of...’.  
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Thus, the final investigation into the metiér of Kynicism 
elaborated three forms of inversion that must be seen crucial 
in any formulation of Kynic peace activism. Throughout the 
foregoing main analysis -- a very detailed, very graphic, and 
indeed very critical observation of our times --, the follow-
ing question could have been read between the lines: How does 
the Kynic topic of «changing the value of the currency» take 
place in contemporary times? 
Due to the limited scope, the Master’s thesis does not aim 
to be more than an outlook for more. It offers a tool kit for 
further investigations into the topic, especially relating the 
initial remarks on biting social-criticism in the form of po-
litical Kabarett: As noted above (though the example of Hagen 
Rether), it is the Kabarett artist of all people who is con-
sidered to be a cynic -- although her/his aim is quite the oppo-
site: to mock societies’ cynicism. The name /K/abarett itself 
reveals the schizophrenia of meaning: while the commercial 
cabaret with /c/ aims for comedy, entertainment, and fun; its 
counterpart with /K/ does the opposite: it performs a harsh 
critique on the grievances and social wrongs -- so does Kyni-
cism in relation to cynicism. Diogenes of Sinope was a figure 
full of virtue, always adverting to the necessity of the com-
mon good. This marks him out from every selfish cynic -- back 
then as well as in our contemporary times. Both disciplines, 
Kynicism and cynicism, share their common ground: they cannot 
take man-made meta-systems such as religions, nation-states, 
or «the good will of the masses» for serious. Whereas the 
Kynic aims for the position of the anti-systemic under dog, 
the cynic merges in the system that he himself can only accept 
as a tool for securing power. 
 The Kynic instead questions everything around him. What 
does it mean to act cynical? Who is the real cynic? Is it the 
«greedy 1%» (whereas the «99%» are perceived to be good) or is 
it rather «the mass» (whereas the «99%» are perceived to act 
cynical)? What does it mean to speak about «truth»? Who uses 
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such a concept and why? What does it mean «to know» -- and who 
can ever argue that «they do not know, but still they are do-
ing it?»  
It is this convolute of questions that I read out of the 
here presented works from George Carlin, Hagen Rether, Kurt 
Tucholsky, Erich Kästner, Johan Galtung, Peter Sloterdijk, 
Michel Foucault, and Slavoj Žižek. All of them must be seen 
crucial for further investigations into the field of The Kaba-
rett of the Kynics. In any further attempt, however, a strong 
women’s voice should not be missed. First and foremost, Bertha 
von Suttner and Rosa Luxemburg come into my mind. So far, the 
considerable gender bias could stand as an ironical, illustra-
tive acceptance of the inheritance of a Western White Old 
Man’s discipline. But the question remains: Why does the here 
presented harsh, Kynic and biting forms of social criticism 
seem to be predominantly masculine?  
Despite being full of crude thoughts; despite being half-
baked, the work in hand sees itself as part of substantial 
critical peace research. And despite all here formulated limi-
tations, the analysis compiled enough vivid data, examples, 
and action patterns for letting the reader inspirationally 
think about his or her very personal (and very possible) con-
tributions of Kynic peace activism. Finally, this outline will 
glean tasks and fields of such investigative resistance. 
All around, critical observers of peace research read 
statements such as: “the initial critical and creative spirit 
of [...] peace research has turned into a ‘normal science’ 
that does not reflect on its basic categories or its role in 
society” (Jutila et al. 2008: 623). Almost 50 years after the 
foundation of the Peace Research Institute in Oslo, Matti 
Jutila, Samu Pehkonen, and Tarja Väyrynen aim for a (more) 
Critical Peace Research “as an epidemic community that can 
house a variety of approaches with a shared understanding of 
the importance o critical reflection, dialogue and creativity” 
(ibidem) -- all these issues are taken up in Kynic Kabarett. 
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What it needs, in my opinion, is more Kynic peace activ-
ism: a concept that diverges itself from realism (think tanks 
such as the Heritage Foundation) on the one hand and positiv-
ist humanitarian good-will activism (within morally impeccable 
actors’ networks such as Save the Children; or Model United 
Nations) on the other. In this debate, the Just War Theory was 
seen as a compromise: neither fully pacifistic (which was 
claimed as being ‘naïve’), nor free of moral. So to say, it 
worked as the antipode compromise of Kynicism: Herein lies the 
possibility of accepting pacifism as a reasonable action while 
denying the possibility of ‘the good and moral masses’. -- A 
negative, rather disillusioned description of «the world as it 
is» does indeed not mean that biting Kabarett satirists and 
Kynics in general negate the possibility of a «better world». 
They only unfold that the way to get there is directly linked 
to our very own lifestyle(s) and thus not easy to go.  
Fast good-will actions such as charity programs or Western 
hippie-oriented peace education programs are not seen as any 
solution. The link between our Hamburger (or -- for the hip-
sters: the Brasilian soya menue) and hunger in the world; the 
link between smart phones and the cynic business of rare 
earths cannot be overcome from 23-years old peace students who 
put on a vest from Human Rights Watch, fly regularly to con-
ferences all over the planet, wear high heel shoes for the 
photo shooting in a Syrian refugee camp while blaming ‘the 
evil dictator who is killing his own people’ based on BBC-, 
CNN- and Al Jazeera-coverage consumption, swim in South Suda-
nese five star hotel pools while wondering how the people man-
age to pay the ‘high local prices for a Latte Macchiato’ -- or 
just get active within SAIH, Greenpeace, Amnesty International 
because it looks good on the CV while cashing up the last vol-
unteer catering full of meat and shrimps and plastic cutlery. 
The wealth of the world is unjustly distributed. It is winter 
in the Arctic. Thank you, global food capitalism, for more 
than two years of free, high-qualitative, pleasantly refriger-
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ated groceries (images 14 and 15). Diverse preliminary works 
of this Master’s thesis were printed on a printer whose ink 
cartridge must be changed every few days because the future 
peace workers prefer to print out complete PowerPoint presen-
tations, one slide each page. Thank you, heated street between 
Peace Centre and main library, for protecting me from falling 
on ice. Thank you, Statoil, meanwhile oil drilling concession 
owner in 36 countries worldwide, for two and a half years of 
free peace, free prints and free pizza!  
In 1922, Kurt Tucholsky wrote: “What oppresses me most of 
all is the complete hopelessness of our esteemed endeavours – 
or let’s rather say: my endeavours. My writing fails to affect 
life. And that’s impossible for me over the longer term” (cit. 
Hierholzer 1990: 16-17). From 1926 on, he became a member of 
the Revolutionary Pacifists Group. 
 
================================================ 
Kynic Kabarett must comment on cultural violence 
================================================ 
 
   
 
Image 10| DGB goes CDU.       Image 11| Twofold-Divided News Coverage on Syria.  
Trade union meets bourgeoisie.   
 
What do we know and why? Kynic Kabarett tries to sort media 
networks according to their Syrian coverage and wonders about 
the creation of two distinct truth settings. It generally eyes 
alliance building between agents of power on all levels and 
aims to make sense of a variety of differently perceived real-
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ities and truths. Why is one wo/man’s terrorist another wo/man’s 
freedom fighter? Does history change societies? Do societies 
change? The examples for more sensible, less sensitive, inves-
tigation are unfathomable. They can be found on every level at 
every time, in every-day life. What does it mean if the major 
trade union supports bourgeois parties? Does it even make 
sense to reflect on such positivist, inner-systemic questions? 
 
============================================== 





Image 12| EliteCommandAR.    Image 13| «Function checks after launching an MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial 
«Toy of the Future».                     vehicle.» August 7, 2007, at Balad Air Base, Iraq. 
 
It must critically reflect the notion of «humanitarian inter-
ventions» and speak out loud against so-called «Just Wars». 
Michael Walzer himself mentiones that “seen from the perspec-
tive of primitive Christianity, this account of just war was 
simply an excuse, a way of making war morally and religiously 
possible” (Walzer 2002: 925). Why is this specific evaluation 
on the mentioned historical account not generally applicable 
to all so-called just wars? What does just war mean outside of 
the diplomatic and academic lingo?  
It must ask: What does it mean if the «the toy of the fu-
ture» promotes smart and realist killer adventures while sur-
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It must primarily invest in the aim to make invisible connec-
tions visible and start with the local supermarket round the 
corner. It must deal with the cynic tip of the overconsumer-
ist’s food globalization iceberg: dumpster meat. (i) Not only 
does our ethical speciesism allow us to lock up, abuse and 
slaughter animals as hell; (ii) not only does an enormous in-
dustrial mass production guarantee an overconsumption of ani-
mals without limits; (iii) not only do we waste others’ basic 
food and water for our nice BBQ steak. As a matter of fact, it 
is better than that: (iv) we do just fill our containers with 
tons of cadavers, making the death of souls even more sense-
less. Day by day we can walk on dozens of them. Just our small 
supermarket in Kvaløya fills a complete container with dead 
animals: two times a week. To make environmental matters 
worse, everything is wrapped into plastic-plastic-plastic. 
That keeps all the other items nicely clean: milk cartons and 
yoghurts do not crack, delicious African, South-East Asian and 
Latin American specialities (something that, naturally, the 
locals who grow the groceries could not effort) land on a 
soft, Arctic container ground -- and today’s drumstick will 

















«-- ... and so on.» 
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